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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Recorded history sheds very little light on option trading, 
although scholars generally agree that it has existed for several 
millenniums. The early Phoenician merchants, and later the Romans, 
traded options on goods in their argosies (9, 79, 87). It is known 
also that forms of commodity option trading existed in the early 
European Pieds Poudres fairs (9, 66, 79). Holland had a thriving 
option trade on tulip bulbs during 1634-1637 (2, 9, 79). 
Sir Charles Leonard Woolley uncovered the Tell al Muqayyar in 1923 
and found countless clay tablets describing transactions in the city of 
Ur. Among the clay tablets were records of "payment in kind" for taxes 
with commodities and records of "rights to buy" certain commodities 
(79, p. 103). The Sumerians were trading in early forms of options as 
early as 5,000 B.C. in Ur. Evidence of options, therefore, covers a 
7,000 year time span. 
Recent history of option trading in the United States shows 
bewilderment and skepticism. Stock options had been regularly traded 
prior to 1932. In that year in drawing up the Securities Act the 
attitude was, "... not knowing the difference between good options 
and bad options, for the matter of convenience we strike them all out" 
(87, p. 10). Subsequently, however, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission did allow the trading of stock-options. The success of the 
stock-options is evidenced by the recent growth, popularity, and volume 
of the Chicago Options Exchange (part of the Chicago Board of Trade). 
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Commodity options, on the other hand, have not fared so well. 
The Commodity Exchange Act of 1922 forbids trading in options on farm 
products. Subsequent rulings also outlawed options on any domestically 
produced commodity regulated by the Commodity Exchange Authority. A 
catch in the Commodity Exchange Act was found in 1971 regarding interna­
tional commodities. The so-called international commodities were not 
under the jurisdiction of the Commodity Exchange Authority. A thriving 
option business was being conducted by mid-1971 on futures contracts for 
silver, silver coins, copper, platinum, coffee, cocoa, sugar, and 
plywood. 
The American options proved highly successful in terms of volume, 
and at least one estimate placed the 1972 dollar volume of option trade 
between $200 - 400 million (111). The absence of governmental 
regulation, high volatility of commodity prices in the early 1970s, 
high volume of trading, and several unscrupulous dealers and underwriters 
provided the elements to bring the newly established market to a virtual 
standstill by late 1973. Public interest was sufficiently stirred by 
commodity options and consequently the 1974 amendments to the Commodity 
Exchange Act [Section 4c (b)] gave power to the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission to regulate the so-called international commodities. Currently 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has suspended all option trading 
in commodities. London options are also forbidden by the recent ruling 
(prior to the ban London options were the mainstay of commodity options 
in the U.S.A.). 
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Problem Situation 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission was prompted to totally 
suspend option trading primarily for two reasons: (1) unscrupulous 
dealers and (2) insufficient economic information for effective regula­
tion. Unscrupulous dealers abounded during the boom days of 1971-1973, 
but the more recent case involving Alan Abrahams alias Jim Carr of 
Lloyd, Carr and Company incited the recent total ban on commodity 
options (75, 82, 98). Lloyd, Carr customers were bilked of approximately 
50 million dollars by charging excessive rates and operating a bucket 
shop (75, 82, 98). Most of the problems of unscrupulous dealers can, 
of course, be corrected over time by proper licensing and bonding in a 
fashion similar to the stock-option market. The problem of insufficient 
information and economic analyses can be corrected only with additional 
research. Some of the major areas that need further research are c 
described in the sections that follow. 
Futures options 
A substantial portion of the additional research, needs to be focused 
on the commodity futures options. Historically option trading in 
commodities has been in conjunction with futures trading because they 
share common ground. Futures and options both involve a contract to buy 
or sell at a future date for a price agreed upon in advance. Furthermore, 
futures contracts have delivery and other contract terms worked out 
whereas options on actuals (the physical commodity) would entail consider­
able problems in these areas. The American option market that developed 
after 1971 and the London option market were options written against 
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futures contracts. The pilot program that the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission had outlined before the recent ban involved only 
options on futures contracts. 
Dealer and exchange options 
Problems exist in deciding who should be allowed to handle the 
trading of commodity options. Currently the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission favors the futures exchanges as the medium for trading. 
Recent court rulings in favor of Mocatta Metals, Inc. points to dealers 
of the actuals also being allowed to handle futures options. This 
presents tremendous regulatory and pricing problems because of de­
centralized trading. 
'Weak' and 'strong' options 
A 'weak' option is one which doesn't have the flexibility of resale. 
A 'strong' option, conversely, is one that can be freely traded. The 
early American options and London options were 'weak' options. Once an 
option was bought it could be terminated only by allowing the option to 
expire or exercising the option via the futures contract. A 'strong' 
option, once bought, can be resold either for a profit or loss without 
allowing it to expire or having to exercise it. The Chicago Options 
Exchange operates with 'strong' stock-options. The Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, at present, favors 'weak' commodity options. 
Fixed and variable striking prices 
The striking price of an option is the price at which the option 
is valued. The stock-option business is based on fixed striking prices. 
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Different striking prices for a stock are offered simultaneously. The 
striking prices will be above or below the current market price (called 
"in-the-money" or "out-of-the-money" respectively) with the difference 
reflected by the premium or cost. A variable striking price typically 
is at or near the current market price. There are advantages and dis­
advantages to each type, but the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
leans toward variable pricing. 
There are, of course, any number of other research problem areas 
in commodity options such as stockpiling, premium variations, margins 
and strategies to name only a few. The fact that so many problem areas 
exist and the fact that very little work has been done necessitates 
some attempt at clarification of the issues and resolving some of the 
problems. 
Problem Justification 
A clarification of the advantages and disadvantages of futures 
versus actuals in options, dealers versus exchange trading, 'weak' 
versus 'strong' options, and fixed versus variable striking prices must 
be resolved before any viable commodity option market can emerge. A 
review of literature (Chapter 3) shows that even the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission is somewhat bewildered by the whole options area, as 
evidenced by its early pilot program for options and then its recent 
total ban. Before any useful economic analysis of options can be 
undertaken the above problem areas must be addressed and clarified to 
the point of narrowing the controversy to a manageable and useful set of 
guidelines. 
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One of the more crucial problems facing the commodity option 
market, however, is its effect on hedging strategies of producers. If 
options exist on futures contracts then producers face an additional 
set of marketing strategies. Commodity options on futures contracts, 
therefore, may represent an alternative and or a complement to hedging 
with the actual futures contract. 
Farmers have been skeptical and reluctant to use commodity futures 
in their marketing plans. In a recent survey of farmers in a midwest 
state it was reported that 83 percent of the respondents never hedged, 
11 percent speculated in commodity futures, but only 2 percent hedged 
on any regular basis (86). Since 11 percent do use the commodity 
futures market as an investment, it must be believed that at least this 
percentage understood the operation of the market, yet only 2 percent 
were willing to use it for marketing their products. It may be that 
the group that never hedged had the security necessary to assume price 
risks or were not willing to have a quasi lock-in price for their 
products, or wanted the opportunity to take advantage of price move­
ments in their favor. Commodity options on futures contracts may allow 
them to enjoy price movements in their favor at a cost (option premium), 
but allow them to set a minimum or maximum price floor or celling by 
exercising their option via the futures contracts. 
In another study of a cross-section of 8,000 farmers, again it 
was discovered that very few used the futures market (80). It was 
felt that a major reason for non-participation is lack of information 
and misconceptions. Many farmers do not understand the mechanics of 
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trading and have formulated unfavorable viewpoints of the markets. 
Others are not willing to commit themselves to a legal agreement that 
would require them to deliver or accept delivery of a product and at 
the same time face the possibility of significant margin calls. The 
commodity option, with its expiration concept, may be viewed as price 
insurance by many farmers, most of whom are users of other types of 
Insurance, to reduce risks in their farming operations. Viewed as a 
kind of Insurance, the commodity option may have an impact on the 
variance of prices farmers receive and on the mean returns of their 
farming operation. 
The effect, therefore, of commodity options as an alternative and 
or a complement to hedging needs to be studied in terms of variance of 
prices and mean returns. 
Obj ectives 
Since commodity options are a relatively new concept to the 
majority of producers and traders, a development of the theory of option 
usage Involving both puts, calls, doubles, and the writing of options 
will be presented. Likewise, the research problem areas involving 
futures versus actuals, dealer versus exchange options, 'weak* versus 
'strong' options, and fixed versus variable striking prices will be 
developed more completely and with greater detail. Commodity option 
strategies will be developed and compared to hedging strategies involving 
live beef cattle futures for variance of prices received and mean returns 
from feedlot enterprises. The three objectives of the study are: 
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Detail and discuss the theory and mechanics of 
how puts, calls, and doubles function and how 
they are purchased and underwritten. 
Evaluate the problems of futures options versus 
actuals options, dealer versus exchange options, 
•weak' versus 'strong' options and fixed versus 
variable striking prices for options. 
Develop, compare, and test various hedging and 
option strategies in live beef cattle futures for 
a typical midwestern cattle feeder in terms of 
variance of prices received and mean returns 
from feeding. 
Objective 1 will explain and give examples of how to use puts, 
calls, and doubles in option trading. The theory and use of underwriting 
options will be presented and examples given. Objective 2 will be a 
literature review and discussion of the issues surrounding each of the 
areas that need further researching. Based on the various advantages 
and disadvantages of each of the areas plus the likely policy the 
commodity Futures Trading Commission will follow, a synthetic option 
market will be outlined to be used to test Objective 3. The purpose of 
Objective 3 will be to test the economic performance in terms of mean 
returns and price variance of the synthetic option market against the 
typical futures markets. From the presentation and analysis of these 
three objectives, various producer and policy recommendations will be 
made. 
Objective 1: 
Objective 2: 
Objective 3; 
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CHAPTER 2. OPTION USAGE 
The actual mechanics and workings of commodity options, while not 
complex, do at least require some basic discussion and definition for 
clarity. Also, to use properly, strategy concepts need to be formulated 
to eliminate erratic option usage and poor option performance. 
Definitions 
Webster describes an option as "the power or right to choose," and 
"a right to buy or sell designated securities or commodities at a 
specified price during the period of the contract" (107» p. 593). 
Zieg and Zieg define an option in the following fashion (111, p. 21); 
IJhen a speculator purchases a commodity option 
he is purchasing the right to assume a position 
in the futures at a certain price, called the strike 
price, and within a certain period of time, running 
from the purchase date to the declaration date. The 
option specifies the commodity, the amount or 
number of contracts, the price at which a futures 
position is taken if the option is exercised, 
whether it is an option to take a long or short 
position in that future, the declaration date on 
which the option expiires, and the premium or charge 
paid by the buyer to the seller for granting the 
option. 
The following list defines the various terms used in the option 
trade. The list concentrates on commodity options but the same basic 
terminology applies to the securities market. 
Call option — The right to buy a commodity on a future date 
for a fixed price. 
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Double option 
Striking Price 
Exercise Price 
Premium 
Put option — The right to sell a commodity on a future date 
for a fixed price. 
— The right to either buy or sell a commodity on 
a future date for a fixed price, but not both 
at the same time. 
— The price at which the option is initially 
purchased or sold (the fixed price on the option 
contract). 
— The market price at the time the option is 
converted. 
— The amount the purchaser of a put or call has 
to pay (cost) for the option or the amount the 
underwriter receives for granting the option. 
Declaration Date — The last date on which the option can be 
exercised or used, after which the option is 
useless. 
Underwriter — The person or firm that grants the option. The 
underwriter is responsible for the option in the 
event it is exercised. 
Straddle — A combination of onç put and one call purchased 
simultaneously at the same striking price. 
Spread — A combination of one put and one call purchased 
simultaneously but at different striking prices. 
Straddle — A combination of two calls and one put. 
Spread — A combination of two puts and one call. 
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Buying Calls 
A call would be purchased if the buyer thought the price of 
the commodity was going to increase. For example, if a trader 
noticed on December 1, on Figure 1, that the chart was giving 
a buy (bull) signal near the 1970 level (point A) he could 
enter an option to take advantage of the supposed move. He 
would purchase a July Silver call for a set premium, say 
Points 
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Figure 1. July Silver (10,000 Troy ounces) bar chart 
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$1,500, at the striking price of $1.70/ounce for a fixed duration — say 
six months. Anytime between December 1 and June 1 he can exercise his 
July Silver option or allow it to expire. Figure 1 shows that July 
Silver eventually went to over 200. If at $2.00/ounce the trader "called" 
his option he would have purchased a July Silver futures contract at 
$1.70 via his option. He then sells a July Silver futures contract on 
the futures market for $2.00 and has captured the $.30/ounce difference 
on a 10,000 Troy ounce contract, the gross gain was $3,000 less $1,500 
premium cost, brokerage fees and interest. Throughout the option time 
duration the traders' only risk was his initial $1,500 premium. He did 
not receive any margin calls nor would he be liable for any losses greater 
than $1,500. What if the trader missed the 200 level price? Suppose 
that he rode the price up to 200 thinking it would go higher, but rode 
it back down to 170 (point B) hoping it would reverse. At the second 
170 level his option time is close to expiration so he must exercise 
it or let it expire. Since there is no profit from exercising, he lets 
it expire. He has lost only his $1,500 premium. 
The advantages of the call option over a regular futures contract 
are: First, the traders' maximum liability for an option is his initial 
premium. He can never lose more than his premium unless his dealer or 
exchange goes bankrupt. Second, there are no margin calls and conse­
quently no interest cost or opportunity cost except on his initial 
premium. The principal disadvantage of an option is the necessity of 
a moderate to large price move before any profit can be realized. On 
a 10,000 Troy ounce Silver contract with a $1,500 premium, prices must 
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increase $.15 per ounce to break-even plus brokerage fees and interest. 
Problems of what the premium should be and the exact striking price are 
other areas that need attention when buying calls. 
The previous example demonstrates a call option on a futures 
contract where only the futures contract was involved, bur no physical 
commodity. An option on the actuals would be similar but involves 
ownership of the physical commodity if the option was exercised. If 
a call on actual silver were exercised, the trader would receive 
ownership of the actual silver and would liquidate on the cash market 
rather than the futures market. 
Gall options are also very useful as a stop loss order. Typically 
when a speculator is short in the futures market a stop loss order is 
used to protect against adverse price moves. During a limit-move day or 
rapid price movements the stop loss order may not get filled or will be 
filled at different prices. The purchase of a call option can provide a 
guaranteed stop loss price against a short sale in the futures market. 
Whether this guaranteed stop loss price is worth more than the more 
erratic futures market stop loss order depends on the individuals 
attitude toward risk and the premium value of the call option. 
Buying Puts 
A put would be purchased if the trader thought prices were going to 
decrease. Figure 2 shows July Silver in a bear price move. If the trader 
was chart trading and saw the short signal near the 195 level (point A) he 
would purchase a put option. At 140 the chart gives a liquidate signal so 
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the option is "put" (exercised). Again, as with a call option, if 
prices did not move in the trader's favor (decrease), the total amount 
the trader could lose would be his premium. If the put option premium 
was $1,500 then the July Silver price would have to decrease $.15 per 
ounce to cover the cost of the option. If the put were purchased at 
$1.95 per ounce, then the price move would have to decrease to $1.80 per 
ounce to break-even plus brokerage costs. 
The variable cost of the option is the brokerage fees (usually $50-
60 per contract) with the fixed cost being the premium. The brokerage 
fees are variable since if the option expired no additional futures 
transaction fees are incurred. Anytime, therefore, that the variable 
costs can be covered, the option should be exercised to recover some 
of the fixed costs. For example, in Figure 2 if the put was purchased 
at 195 ($1.95 per ounce) but prices had fallen only to 185 by the time 
the option was ready to expire, the trader should liquidate the option. 
The fixed cost of the put was the $1,500 premium or .15 per ounce with 
.01 per ounce additional as interest costs and consider the brokerage 
fees (variable costs) to represent .02 per ounce. To break-even the price 
move must be at least .15 + .01 + .02 = .18 per ounce. The brokerage 
fees incurred when the option is exercised are .02 per ounce, therefore 
anytime the price move is greater than .02 per ounce a contribution to 
fixed costs can be realized by exercising the option. Only if the price 
move were under .02 per ounce would the option be allowed to expire or 
die. 
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Figure 3L shows the price moves necessary to break?-even, to exercise, 
and to expire the option. 
Speculators will consider placing the option initially only if 
returns above fixed and variable costs are positive, that is, below 
the break-even line in Figure 3. On the other hand, traders who use 
options as "hedges" or "insurance" should consider placing (buying) the 
option when returns above variable costs are positive, that is, below 
the exercising line in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. July Silver (10,000 Troy ounces) bar charts showing 
the break-even lines 
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Put options, like call options, can be used as a stop loss 
technique against a long position in the futures market. The put 
can be exercised (a right to sell) and consequently the long position 
is liquidated. The use of puts and calls as stop loss orders must 
be tempered with risk attitudes, premium costs, and how 'nervous' the 
market is to price moves. They should be considered only if the 
market is erratic enough to give false liquidate signals to normal 
futures stop loss orders. Calls and puts used as stop orders can 
eliminate these 'nervous' false liquidate orders. 
Double Options 
A double option gives the o^mer the right to buy or sell a 
commodity futures contract. The buyer cannot do both at the same time, 
however. The trader must either buy (call) or sell (put) but he 
cannot use the double to do both — that has to be done in the futures 
market or the cash market. The double was very popular during the 
brief domestic commodity option market from 1971-73 because it offered 
tremendous potential. To use puts and calls separately, the trader 
must be willing and or able to predict the direction of price movements. 
If the prediction is wrong, he loses his premium, if the prediction is 
right he recovers all, less, or more than his premium. With a double 
option the necessity of predicting the direction of price is removed. 
If prices move up the call can be exercised, or if they move down the 
put can be exercised. 
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This flexibility has a cost, however. Usually the premium for 
a double is the sum of a put and call purchased separately. If a trader 
wants to purchase a double option, additional volitality in price moves 
must occur for the option to be profitable. Figure 4 shows March Sugar 
in a period of congestion between 650 and 850. No clear chart buy or 
sell signals are visible; thus, the trader could purchase a double option 
if he felt the March Sugar contract would be volatile enough to cover 
the premium. If the double was purchased for $3,000 and struck at 
700 for a 6-month option the trader can take advantage of the time 
factor. Usually doubles are not exercised until the last of the contract 
time unless a profit move has definitely changed. This allows for the 
full flexibility of the double. Of course, if a substantial profit 
can be achieved before expiration, the double is usually exercised. 
In Figure 4» prices decline to less than 550 but finally rebound to 
nearly 1050. If the trader had purchased a put he would have lost 
his option premium if he held it past the 550 point. Thus, 
afforded the trader the luxury of not having to predict price 
direction, only volatility. 
Tables 1 and 2 show how a double option on Cocoa performed over a 
seven-year period and how a Sugar double option performed over a ten-
year period. The results do not include any "hedging" techniques and 
thus are biased downward. 
These performance results are reported by Zieg and Zieg (111) 
but they do not correspondingly report any offsetting results. Since 
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Figure 4. March Sugar (112,000 U.S. Pounds) bar chart 
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Table 1. Performance of a cocoa double option held to maturity and 
liquidated on the profit side (111, p. 91) 
Contract 
Year 
Striking 
Price 
Price 
Sxercised 
Gross 
Return^ Premium 
Net 
Profit or 
Loss % 
1963 3.50 Ç 7.20 $4,150 $ 705 + 490% 
1964 4.75 8.60 4,310 905 + 376% 
1965 7.00 2.40 5,150 1,410 + 265% 
1966 3.00 2.12 990 605 + 64% 
1967 3.00 2.15 950 605 + 57% 
1968 2.00 1.64 520 425 + 22% 
1969 3.00 3.84 940 605 + 55% 
1970 3.30 3.40 110 665 - 83% 
1971 3.50 4.70 1,350 705 + 92% 
1972 (1) 4.60 7.46 3,200 1,350 + 137% 
Annual average gross return $2,167, annual average investment 
$798, annual average net profit $1,369, and annual average percentage 
return 172 percent. 
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Table 2. Performance of a sugar double option held to maturity and 
liquidated on the profit side (111, p. 92) 
Net 
Contract Striking Price Gross Profit or 
Year Price Exercised Return^ Premium Loss % 
1965 25.00 f 19.20 $1,740 $1,800 - 3% 
1966 14.00 24.50 3,150 1,800 + 75% 
1967 26.00 28.00 600 1,800 - 67% 
1968 27.00 43.50 4,950 1,800 + 175% 
1969 28.00 40.00 3,600 1,800 + 100% 
1970 41.00 27.50 4,050 1,800 + 125% 
1971 28.50 23.50 1,500 1,800 - 17% 
^Annual average gross return $2,800, annual average investment 
$1,800, annual average net profit $1,000 and annual average percentage 
return 55 percent. 
assumptions under ^ ich they were generated are not known, no attempt 
is made to produce contrary results. They are presented to show the 
upside potential that doubles possess and as an example of the 
techniques used to generate double option business during the life of 
the American option market. Doubles offer upside (profit) potential 
only on very volatile price moves and correspondingly the downside 
(loss) potential exists during less erratic price movements. The 
maximum loss, of course, is limited to the premium amount. 
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Zieg and Zieg list two principal trading strategies for double 
options based on past price moves. The first strategy, called the 
Comparison Rule, says that the double premium should be compared to 
the average range over an equivalent period and if the premium is 
equal to or greater than this past range, the option should be rejected 
( 111, p. 107). Since the Comparison Rule does not distinguish 
between relative profit levels, a rule for ranking the most profitable-
looking options was developed called the Value Premium Ratio. The VPR 
is the futures price range for one-half the double's life length 
divided by the premium cost of the double option. This ratio is based 
on the assumption that the last months of a futures price move are 
more representative than older moves of the future potential of price 
moves (thus the 1/2 — the time is divided in half). Ranking of the 
VPR ratios shows the relative profitability of the options. Any ratio 
less than two is rejected with the higher ratios meaning higher relative 
profitability ( 111, p. 111). Zieg and Zieg do not report any 
examples of the ratios use or performance. 
Writing Options 
In addition to buying puts and calls the possibility also exists 
to write (grant) options. There can be no buying of options unless 
someone is granting (selling) the puts and calls. Although an infinite 
array of option granting strategies exist for both puts and calls, only 
the basic strategies involving 'naked' and 'covered' options will be 
discussed in this section. 'Covered' calls and puts are options that 
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are written when the actual commodity is owned in sufficient quantity 
and quality to 'cover' the option. Likewise a 'naked' option does not 
have the physical backing of the commodity. 
More complicated strategies concerning 'weak' and 'strong' options, 
fixed and variable striking prices, and dealer and exchange options will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Writing calls 
The simplest and least risky type of call writing involves a 
covered call. An individual purchases a futures contract on a commodity, 
say corn (5,000 bushels of #2 yellow). Thus, he actually has the 
commodity futures contract and an option written against it would be 
'covered'. The commodity futures contract could be held waiting for a 
price rise, but the possibility also exists for a price decrease. As 
an alternative to this uncertain situation, the futures contract holder 
could write an option against the contract. 
If the individual purchased the futures contract in corn at the 
market price (say $2/bushel),° he has committed the margin requirements 
for the contract (approximately $l,000/contract). Figure 5 shows the 
price chart for the March '78 corn contract and the point (Point A) 
where the contract was purchased. Since no clear technical or fundamental 
signals are observed as to which direction price will move, writing an 
option is a possible alternative. 
The individual writes a call at a striking price of $2/bushel -
90 days ; this gives the buyer of the call the option of 'calling" his 
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futures contract anytime during the next 90 days for $2/ bushel. II::» 
receives a premium for writing the call from the buyer, say 10 percent 
($1,000). By writing a call against his futures contract he has 
truncated the upside potential of price increases by the amount of the 
premium, and reduced the loss from price decreases by the amount of the 
premium. For example, after 45 days if the price of the March '78 corn 
contract had risen to $2.30/bushel (point B in Figure 5) the buyer "calls" 
the option to be exercised at $2/bushel. The writer must deliver the 
long futures contract for $2/bushel. The buyer takes the long futures 
contract at $2/bushel and offsets the position by selling a futures 
contract for $2.30/bushel. He has made 300/bushel - 20f/bushel premium, 
or lOf/bushel in added revenue (ignoring brokerage fees, handling costs, 
and opportunity costs), see Table 3. 
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Figure 5. Bar chart for March 1978 corn (CBT) 
25 
Table 3. Example of a call option writer and buyer strategy 
during rising prices 
Writer 
Owner of the long 
futures contract 
writes a call option 
$2 per bushel 
$1,000 or .20* per 
bushel (5,000 bushels) 
Writer delivers long 
futures contract at 
$2 per bushel 
Striking Price 
Premium 
Price increases 
to $2.30 per bushel 
Buyer 
Purchases call 
option 
$2 per bushel 
$1,000 or .?0ç per 
bushel (5,000 bushels) 
Buyer "calls" the 
option 
Buyer offsets long 
futures at $2.30 
per bushel by selling 
a futures contract 
Writer received .200 
per bushel above what 
he paid for the 
futures contract or 
$1,000 less 
brokerage fees plus 
interest 
Buyer received .30C 
per bushel from 
futures transaction 
less .20c per bushel 
premium cost less 
brokerage fees and 
interest 
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The writer, on. the other hand, has confined his revenue to the 
amount of the premium, or 20<?/bushel. The writer sacrifices the right 
to "winners" (price increases greater than the premium) for the premium 
amount. On an annualized basis, however, the writer received in advance 
an 800 percent return on his $1,000 investment (45 days) or 400 percent 
for the full run of the option (90 days). (He received $1,000 in 
premium for his $1,000 investment — annually that's 100 percent, but 
for 45 days it's 8 times that ») 
On price downsides the writer faces two possible actions. First, 
if prices fall the writer can sell the futures contract (offset his 
long position) when the option expires (any price decrease would 
preclude a profit-taking buyer from wanting to exercise the option). 
If the price decrease is less than the premium, then the writer has a 
net positive position from the transaction (ignoring brokerage fees, 
handling costs, and opportunity costs). The premium has therefore 
reduced the effect of downside price movements. The second action the 
writer might want to consider would be to keep the futures contract and 
write a new call option at the lower striking price. If the price fell 
to $1.80/bushel (point C in Figure 5), the writer was protected (net 
zero) by his premium (20«?/bushel) . He now writes a new call option for 
90 days, striking price of $1.80/bushel, and a premium of 10 percent 
(18<:/bushel). Thus, by continuous writing the grantor can limit losses 
and establish a quasl-floor on price decreases. Table 4 illustrates 
this example. 
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Table 4. Call option writer and buyer strategies under falling prices 
Writer Buyer 
Owner of the long 
futures contract 
writes a call option 
$2 per bushel 
$1,000 or .20* per 
bushel (5,000 bushels) 
Sell futures contract 
$2 -$1.80 = .20C 
loss per bushel less 
brokerage fees and 
interest 
Striking Price 
Premium 
Price decreased to 
$1.80 per bushel 
at expiration date 
Purchases call 
option 
$2 per bushel 
$1,000 or .20Ç per 
bushel (5,000bushels) 
Any price decrease 
would preclude the 
buyer from exercising 
the option 
$1.80 per bushel 
$900 or .18* per 
bushel (5,000 bushels) 
Rewrite Option 
Striking Price 
Premium 
$1.80 per bushel 
$900 or .180 per 
bushel (5,000 bushels) 
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Commodity futures price movements are typically asymmetric due to 
trends in most agricultural products; therefore, the writer can 
judiciously determine when opportune times exist to stop writing or 
continue writing additional covered calls. The duration of futures 
contracts (typically no longer than a year) places additional constraints 
on the writer's strategies. 
Writing naked calls necessarily involves more risks than covered 
calls. If the buyer exercises the option, the writer must deliver the 
futures contract. The writer, therefore, must go into the futures 
market and purchase the contract to deliver. Suppose a grantor writes 
a 90 day call on a March corn contract for $2/bushel with a 10 percent 
premium. In 20 days, the price has increased to $2.30/bushel so the buyer 
"calls" the option. Since the call was naked, the writef goes into the 
futures market and pays $2.30/bushel for a long contract and delivers to 
the buyer for $2/bushel. The grantor lost 30C/bushel on the futures 
transaction but received 20*/bushel premium, for a net loss of 
lOç/bushel. If the call had been covered the net gain in revenue would 
have been 20<?/bushel instead of a 10*/bushel loss with the naked call. 
On the other hand, ownership of the futures contract entails handling 
costs, margin requirements, brokerage fees, and opportunity costs. 
Because of these costs, naked call writing appeals more to speculators 
than commodity owners or managers (Table 5)• 
Writing puts 
Writing covered puts in commodities involves a twist in logic. The 
writer of a put is saying that he will deliver a short futures position 
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Table 5. Writer and buyer strategies for naked call options 
Writer Buyer 
Naked call option 
written 
$2 per bushel 
$1,000 or .200 per 
bushel (5,000 bushels) 
Writer must deliver a 
long futures contract 
at $2 per bushel so he 
enters the futures 
market and pays $2.30 
per bushel 
Long futures delivered 
to buyer 
Writer lost .30* per 
bushel on transaction 
plus a gain of .20c 
from the premium and 
interest less brokerage 
fees 
Striking Price 
Premium 
Price increased to 
$2.30 per bushel 
Call purchased 
$2 per bushel 
$1,000 or .20c per 
bushel (5,000 bushels) 
Buyer calls the 
option 
Buyer takes long 
futures called at $2 
per bushel and 
offsets by selling 
at $2.30 per bushel -
a gross gain of .30* 
per bushel less 
premium, interest 
and brokerage fees 
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(a sell contract) to the buyer of the put. Thus, if the buyer of the 
put exercises his option, the grantor must deliver a short futures 
contract. For the writer of the put to have his position covered 
implies that he must sell (at the time the option is written) a contract 
on the futures market. 
Consider, as an example, an individual who writes a put on a March 
corn futures contract. The put is written with a striking price of 
$2/bushel - 90 days, at a premium of 10 percent. The buyer has the 
right in the next 90 days of "putting" to the writer, that is exercising 
the option. In the physical market this would involve the actual 
transfer by the buyer of the commodity to the writer. In the securities 
market the buyer 'puts* to the writer the stock which the writer must 
take at the striking price. The twist of logic in options on commodity 
futures occurs when the buyer 'puts' his option. The buyer does not put 
anything to the writer when he exercises the option. The writer delivers 
a short (Sell) futures contract to the buyer. The writer, therefore, 
actually 'puts', not the buyer. 
The buyer is actually hoping for a price decrease with the put. If 
the price of the March corn futures drops to $1.70/bushel during the next 
60 days, the buyer exercises his option. The writer delivers a sell 
futures contract purchased at $2/bushel to the buyer. The buyer then 
buys a futures contract at $1.70/bushel to offset for a gain of 
300/bushel - 20<?/bushel premium or a net revenue gain of 10*/bushel 
(ignoring brokerage fees, handling costs, and opportunity costs). The 
writer's gain was only the 20f/bushel premium. Thus, the maximum gain 
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from writing a put when the put Is exercised in a downward market Is 
the amount of the premium. The writer had to establish margin for the 
sell futures contract of approximately $1,000. He received $1,000 in 
premium from the buyer, for a 600 percent annualized rate in advance 
for 60 days or 400 percent for the full 90 days (Table 6). 
A price increase would result in the option not being exercised. 
It also results in a loss for the writer if he offsets his sell futures 
contract. The grantor may, therefore, keep the sell contract and 
reissue a new put option after 90 days. How much the writer makes or 
loses in a rising market depends on the amount of the price Increase, 
when the futures contract is offset, and if a new put is issued. 
Writing naked puts would mean the grantor does not have a sell 
futures contract to cover the option. If the buyer exercises the 
option the writer must enter the futures market and sell a futures 
contract to deliver to the buyer. In the previous example, the writer 
of the option would have to go into the futures market and sell a 
contract for $1.70/bushel, and make up the difference between it and 
the striking price ($2/bushel). Thus, the writer lost lOf/bushel with 
the naked put rather than making 20*/bushel had it been covered. 
If the naked put is not exercised, however, then huge annualized 
returns exist for the writer. The naked put writer does not have the 
initial margin requirement that covered writers have. If the option is 
not exercised, he has gained $1,000 in premiums for no initial invest­
ment. The annualized premium would be infinite with a zero Investment, 
but for a $1 investment, the annualized rate would be 4,000 percent. 
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Table 6. Writer and buyer strategies for put options 
Writer Buyer 
A put option is 
written against 
a short futures 
contract 
$2 per bushel 
$1,000 or .20* per 
bushel (5,000 
bushels) 
Striking Price 
Premium 
A put option is 
purchased 
$2 per bushel 
$1,000 or . 20<: per 
bushel (5,000 
bushels) 
Writer must 
deliver a 
short futures 
contract at 
$2 per bushel 
Writer has a gross 
gain of .20<? per 
bushel plus interest 
less brokerage fees 
Price decreases to 
$1.70 per bushel 
Buyer exercises 
his option 
Buyer offsets short 
futures by buying a 
contract for a 
gross gain of .30ç 
per bushel less 
premium, interest, 
and brokerage fees 
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These exorbitant annualized returns serve to show only the possible 
returns. It is very possible a writer can experience large losses, 
also. For instance, if a grantor held on to a sell futures contract 
and continues writing puts in a rising market he faces the possibility 
of large losses when he offsets the futures contract. A naked option 
writer faces the possibility of large losses if the option is exercised 
during substantial price moves. Losses under these conditions can be 
just as large on an annualized basis as the gains mentioned previously. 
Call and Put Strategies 
The basic strategies of puts and calls were outlined in the previous 
sections. Detailed strategies usually center around margin requirements, 
exercise costs (brokerage fees), current tax laws, individuals attitude 
toward risk, and the individuals own financial situation. Auster 
( 2, p. 38 ) provides a very detailed set of strategies for securities 
that can be modified for commodity options. The Chicago Board of Trade 
(9, p. 20 ) offers strategy sets for securities that have possible 
application to commodity options. These two sources can provide a 
flavor for detailed strategies. No attempt will be made in this thesis 
to develop rigorous strategies concerning margins, tax laws, etc., 
because of the unknown values of these variables. 
Table 7 shows a basic strategy matrix for put and call grantors. 
A call writer will only face the "call" of the option when price 
increases enough to cover brokerage and handling costs. For small 
increases, all price decreases, and stable prices the call remains 
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Table 7. Basic strategy matrix for commodity option writers 
on futures contracts 
Price 
MovemenC Calls Puts 
Greater 
than 
exercise 
costs 
Price 
Increase 
a 
Less 
than 
exercise 
costs 
Deliver long futures 
contract to buyer, 
and: 
1. Take no further 
action 
2. Reissue a new call 
Option not exercised 
1. Offset short 
futures if covered 
and take no 
further action 
2. Reissue a new put 
Option not exercised 
1. Reissue a new call 
2. Offset long 
fucures if covered 
and cake no 
furCher accion 
Option noC exercised 
1. Offsec short 
fucures If covered 
and cake no 
furcher action 
2. Reissue a new put 
Greater 
than 
exercise 
costs 
Price 
Decrease 
Less 
Chan 
«XêrC Lsè 
costs 
Option not exercised 
1. Offset long 
fucures if covered 
and Cake no 
further action 
2. Reissue a new call 
Deliver short fucures 
contract to buyer, 
and: 
1. Take no further 
action 
2. Reissue a new put 
Option not exercised 
1. Offset lùilg 
futures if covered 
and take no 
further accion 
2. Reissue a new call 
Option not exercised 
1. CffseC yhùirt 
futures if covered 
and take no 
further action 
2. Reissue a new put 
s table 
Prices 
Option not exercised 
1. Reissue a new call 
2. Offset long 
futures if covered 
and take no 
further action 
Option not exercised 
1. Reissue a new puc 
2. offsec short 
futures If covered 
and Cake no 
furcher accion 
\ess than enough Co exercise options is defined as only the 
amount Co cover brokerage and handling fees for che option and futures 
contracts. 
35 
unexercised. The put, likewise, remains unexercised except during price 
declines greater than brokerage and handling fees. Brokerage and 
handling fees, therefore, provide a threshold for option exercising. 
If a call buyer purchased the option at a striking price of $2/bushel, 
then the buyer would call the option only if prices increased enough to 
cover incurred costs. The buyer has to pay brokerage fees for the 
option plus brokerage fees for the futures contract if he exercises 
the option. He also has to put up margin on the futures contracts if 
the option is exercised. If these costs amount to say 5ç/bushel then 
the threshold level becomes $2.05/bushel for calls and $1.95 for puts. 
Securities option writers typically take advantage of this by reissuing 
calls and puts on the underlying stock. Less than 40 percent of 
securities options are exercised because of the threshold effect and 
contrary price moves ( 16, p. 91). 
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CHAPTER 3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Although commodity options have existed for at least 7,000 years, 
very little information on their use is available. Most of the recorded 
information concerning commodity options has been generated since 1971. 
Stock options on the other hand, have been richly represented in the 
literature since the 1930s. The literature is also well-endowed with 
discussions of hedging on commodity futures and with the regulation of 
commodity markets via the Commodity Exchange Authority and more recently 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulated the 
futures markets and commodity markets via the Commodity Exchange 
Authority (CEA) before 1974 ( 97, p. 61). In 1974, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Act created the independent Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC). This law also had a "sunset" provision which forced 
re-evaluation of the new commission after 1978 ( 97, p. 60). Although 
the Securities Exchange Commission and the Treasury Department fought 
for part of the CFTC's power, the 1978 congressional hearings 
re-authorized the CFTC substantially as it was prior to 1978 
( 98, p. 34). 
Prior to 1974, the so-called international commodities that the CEA 
did not have the authority to regulate developed option trading. The 
1974 Act that established the CFTC brought the so-called international 
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commodities and options under its control. Schneider reported that the 
CFTC has the authority to (1) ban options on the so-called international 
commodities or (2) if regulation can correct the past abuses, to adopt 
the necessary regulation (95, p. 44). 
Option regulation 
When American options began in 1971^ new interest was also generated 
in the London commodity options. Reiss lists the size and types of both 
London and American option contracts that existed in late 1972 
(92, p. 16) (Table 8). 
Table 8. Futures and options specifications 1972 
American 
Commodity London Futures and Options Futures and Options 
Silver 10,000 Troy ounces 5,000 Troy ounces 
Sugar 50 Long Tons (112,000 pounds) 112,000 pounds 
Copper 25 Metric Tons (55,115 pounds) 25,000 pounds 
Cocoa 10 Metric Tons (22,046 pounds) 30,000 pounds 
Coffee 5 Metric Tons (11,023 pounds) 37,500 pounds 
Rubber 15 Metric Tons (33,069 pounds) 33,000 pounds 
Tin 5 Metric Tons (11,023 pounds) Not Traded 
Lead 25 Metric Tons (55,155 pounds) Not Traded 
Zinc 25 Metric Tons (55,155 pounds) Not Traded 
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Zieg and Zieg reported the following list as of early 1973 
( 111, p. 31) (Table 9). 
Table 9. Futures and options specifications 1973 
Commodity London Futures and Options 
American 
Futures and Options 
Silver 10,000 Troy ounces 10,000 Troy ounces 
Sugar 50 Long Tons (112,000 pounds) 112,000 pounds 
Copper 25 Metric Tons (55,015 pounds) 30,000 pounds 
Cocoa 5 Long Tons (11,200 pounds) 30,000 pounds 
Coffee 5 Long Tons (11,200 pounds) 37,500 pounds 
Rubber 5 Long Tons (11 ,200 pounds) Not Traded 
Platinum Not Traded 50 Troy ounces 
Plywood Not Traded 69,120 pounds 
The size and type of options changed substantially in the early 
years of the new market. As with any new market, experience had to be 
gained but it was slow in coming and the new market began to 
falter. As Zieg and Zieg report (111, pp. 26, 27): 
. . . the relatively low moral integrity of many 
salesmen and underwriters - nurtured by the lack 
of regulations, controls, and safeguards; inexperi­
enced clerical and managerial personnel; accounting 
systems designed for one-tenth of the peak volume at 
best; and the inefficiencies as well as capital and 
managerial drain, resulting from many firms opening 
new offices daily, brought the industry to a near 
standstill by early 1973. 
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The situation was further complicated when the 
securities commissioners of a handful of states — 
including California, the home state for most 
underwriters and dealers - seeing the potential 
risks to investors of such practices, filed civil 
and/or criminal suits against a number of firms. The 
firms retaliated with counter suits for damages. 
Tempers flared, more suits and counter suits were 
filed, and the confused investors, totally baffled 
by the situation, stopped payment on their checks 
and made runs on the cash reserves of the dealers. 
The final result was chaos, corporate bankruptcies, 
and investor losses. 
The industry stumbled along for several months trying to reorganize 
and overcome the adverse effects of the 1973 burst. Jobman reports that 
the options firms formed the National Association of Commodity Options 
Dealers (N AS COD) ( 74, p. 22). Roy Kavanaugh, chairman of the board 
of First Western Commodity Options, Inc. and spokesman for the new 
association was quoted as indicating that NASCOD wanted to take an 
active part in regulating the industries and establishing Industry 
standards and guidelines ( 74, p. 22). Kavanaugh also stated (in 
December. 1976), "a year from now (1977), I can see the options business 
in a completely different posture, and in three years it'll really be 
a vital financial force, no doubt about it" ( 75, p. 12). Armed with 
new strength from the 1974 Amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act, the 
CFTC seemed to have a different view. 
Pilot program 
The CFTC began in earnest in late 1975 and early 1976 to respond 
to the needs of the options market. In November, 1976, the CFTC 
proposed the following regulations (96, p. 28); 
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1. London option firms will have to segregate 90 percent of 
customer funds in the U.S. 
2. Futures commission merchants (FCM) will not have to provide 
full details of option price, premium and commissions to the 
prospective customer 24 hours in advance as earlier proposed 
regulations stated. But the FCM, to comply with the revised 
disclosure section of the new rules, will still be required 
to give the potential customer more generalized information 
at the time the deal is being negotiated and would have to 
provide a customer with a confirmation statement of all 
details within 24 hours of the option being struck. Dealers 
will not have to make a summary disclosure statement on each 
transaction with a customer if they have previously given that 
customer a breakout statement on fees, charges, premiums, 
markups, risks, etc. in that transaction. 
3. Any FCM dealing in commodity options will still have to 
maintain a $50,000 pool of working capital. 
4. All commodity dealers will still have to be FCM'a and will 
still have to be registered with the CFTC by the previously 
designated date of January 17, 1977. 
The above regulations were proposed to go into effect on November 22, 
1976 ( 96, p. 28). They were, however, delayed until about December 13, 
1980. Currently (January, 1980), the regulations are still in effect 
because of the total ban. 
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Jarecki reports and lists comparisons between the current dealer 
options, London options, and the proposed exchange option program as of 
July, 1977 in Table 10 (72, p. 51). 
The CFTC opened a "hotline" that interested parties could call 
concerning options and the new proposed pilot program. The line 
received calls at the rate of one a minute as interest in options 
soared (76, p. 10). 
The proposed regulations went into effect on January 1, 1977 but 
several suits and petitions forced the CFTC to rethink its regulations. 
The CFTC won a major battle against these suits and petitions when the 
Supreme Court refused to hear a petition concerning the CFTC's right to 
regulate options (76, p. 12). 
Even so, the CFTC decided to change its regulation on August 30, 
1977. The CFTC issued its set of rule changes called "Part B of the 
Options Regulations," which would, according to Sarnoff (93, p. 38), 
(a) finalize the rules for trading of London options in the U.S. and 
(b) set guidelines for trading of listed domestic commodity options on 
American commodity exchanges. 
Sarnoff summarizes the new rule changes and the pilot American 
exchange options as follows (93, p. 39): 
1. Permits vending of London options to Americans only by broker/ 
dealers who are members of the International Commodity Clearing 
House (ICCH) and vending of metal options only if customers are 
Table 10, Comparing U.S. exchange options, domestic dealer options, and London options^ 
U.S. EXCHANGE DOMESTIC DEALER 
TRADING MECHANICS OPTIONS OPTIONS LONDON OPTIONS 
Location & Method Open outcry in Office-to-office Some on exchanges; 
central some office-to-
marketplace office 
Trading 
Time & 
Trading Hours Specified and Normal business Normal U. K. 
Place limited, approx. hours, 9 am - 5 pm business hours 
And 10 am - 2:30 pm (8 am - 12 Noon, 
New York time) 
Market 
Features 
Continuous Price Customer's broker Customer's broker Customer's broker 
Dissemination can receive can receive obtains quotes 
continuous prices continuous quotes from U. S. whole­
on a ticker or on a screen or by saling broker. 
screen or by direct line London broker, or 
direct line telephone from London dealer by 
telephone from dealer. He also telephone. No 
exchange floor. receives opening continuous quotes 
and closing price available. 
details from dealer 
daily. 
^Source: (72, p. 51). 
Table 10. (Continued) 
U.S. EXCHANGE DOMESTIC DEALER 
TRADING MECHANICS OPTIONS OPTIONS LONDON OPTIONS 
Trade Price Dissemi­
nation Trade-by-trade T rad e-by-trad e Estimated but not 
TfAfli ne price runs without price runs with necessarily traded X L ctUXllg 
trade time availa­ trade time availa­ "settlement" 
Time & ble. ble. prices published. 
Place No price runs 
available. 
and 
Market 
Volume And Open Volume and open Volume and open Volume and open 
Features Interest Dissemination interest published interest published interest available 
(cont.) daily. daily. on ICCH. 
Table 10. (Continued) 
U.S. EXCHANGE DOMESTIC DEALER 
TRADING MECHANICS OPTIONS OPTIONS LONDON OPTIONS 
Quotations 
Contract 
Terras 
Two-way buy/sell 
market. Customer-
broker-floor 
broker interaction 
by telex or tele­
phone. Competing 
floor brokers. 
Two-way buy/sell 
market. Dealer-
broker-customer 
interaction by 
telex or tele­
phone. 
Selling quotes 
only. Option 
close-out only by 
exercise. Commu­
nications by tele­
phone and telex to 
customer-broker 
dealer. 
Contract & Trading 
Terms 
Well-defined, 
easily understood 
contracts with 
fixed striking 
price and fixed 
maturity date. 
Well-defined, 
easily understood 
contracts with 
fixed striking 
price and fixed 
maturity date. 
Contract terms 
vary. All have 
variable striking 
prices, some have 
fixed maturity 
dates, some do not. 
Assignability None None None 
Table 10. (Continued) 
TRADING MECHANICS 
U.S. EXCHANGE 
OPTIONS 
DOMESTIC DEALER 
OPTIONS LONDON OPTIONS 
Contract 
Terms 
(cont.) 
Nature of Option 
Buyer's Right 
Right to convert 
contract to a futures 
contract (which he 
must then margin or 
isell). 
Continuous right to 
call for commodity 
i.e., need not wait 
until expiration 
date. 
Right to convert 
contract to a 
futures contract 
(which he must 
then margin or 
sell) 
Can Be Liquidated By Yes Yes No 
Offset 
Table 10. (Continued) 
TRADING MECHANICS 
U.S. EXCHANGE 
OPTIONS 
DOMESTIC DEALER 
OPTIONS LONDON OPTIONS 
Costs; 
Disposi­
tion and 
Customer's Costs Premium plus 
single, defined, 
moderate brokerage 
Premium plus 
single, defined, 
moderate brokerage 
Premium plus U.K. 
broker's (not always 
moderate) commission 
markup 
Protec­
tion of 
eus toraer 
Premium Payments Possibly margined Paid in full Paid in full 
funds 
Customers Premium 
funds 
Held in dollars 
in U.S. bank 
Held in dollars 
in U.S. bank 
Currently paid to 
grantor who deposits 
sterling or (more 
frequently) asks a 
U.K. bank to issue a 
sterling denominated 
guarantee to ICCH 
Customer's Profits Can be calculated 
in and are paid 
in dollars 
Can be calculated 
in and are paid 
in dollars 
Can only be calcu 
Table 10. (Continued) 
U.S. EXCHANGE DOMESTIC DEALER 
TRADING MECHANICS OPTIONS OPTIONS LONDON OPTIONS 
Costs; 
Disposi­
tion and 
Protec­
tion of 
customer 
funds 
(cont.) 
Striking Price 
Currency 
Dollars Dollars Sterling 
Protection of 
Customer's Premiums 
Margin deposits with 
clearinghouse segre­
gated in U.S. bank 
Customer's funds 
held in U.S. banks 
segregated from 
general funds of 
dealer and broker 
Customer's funds 
held either by 
grantor or (Part B) 
foreign commodity 
exchange in U.K. 
Protection of 
Customer's Profits 
Customer's profit 
is segregated for 
his benefit either 
with clearinghouse 
or in his account 
with broker 
Customer's profit 
is transferred 
daily to account 
segregated for 
customer's benefit 
Table 10. (Continued) 
TRADING MECHANICS 
U.S. EXCHANGE 
OPTIONS 
DOMESTIC DEALER 
OPTIONS 
LONDON OPTIONS 
Legal 
i Applicable Law United States United States United Kingdom 
Frame­
work 
and 
con­
straints 
CFTC Jurisdiction Yes, along entire 
chain 
Yes, along entire 
chain 
Only at FCM level; 
no influence over 
rules 
Protection of Customer 
from Fraud 
Customer's broker 
must be registered 
î'CM 
Customer's broker 
must be registered 
FCM 
Customer's broker 
must be registered 
FCM if customer if 
in U.S. 
CFTC Recourse to 
Unwarranted Changes 
in Contract or 
Trading Terms 
Can nullify Can nullify Cannot nullify; can 
only withdraw "rec 
Ability to Time-Stamp 
Orders Within One Minute 
Probably not Yes No 
Books and Records 
Available to CFTC 
Yes Yes No 
Table 10. (Continued) 
TRADING MECHANICS 
U.S. EXCHANGE 
OPTIONS 
DOMESTIC DEALER 
OPTIONS LONDON OPTIONS 
Other 
Model and Data For 
Computerized Trading 
No Yes No 
Input to Data 
Gathering for 
Pilot Program 
Yes Yes No 
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provided with a contract signed by a ring-dealing member of 
the London Metal Exchange (LME). 
2. Permits trading of both puts and calls (no doubles) on domestic 
commodity exchanges approved for such trading — but those 
exchanges would be initially barred from trading both kinds of 
options on the same commodity. 
3. Permits trading on physical commodity options such as those 
proposed by the American Stock Exchange Commodity branch (The 
American Commodity Exchange). 
4. Permits trading of dealer options, such as Mocatta Options, on 
precious metals only — if the CFTC is satisfied appropriate 
safeguards can be established by approved dealers as a substi­
tute for clearing mechanism. 
5. Domestic commodity exchanges slated to trade options include: 
Chicago Board of Trade — Ginnie Mae (puts) 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange — Gold (calls) 
New York Comex — Copper, Gold, Silver (calls) 
New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange — Coffee, Sugar (calls) 
New York Cocoa Exchange — Cocoa (calls) 
American Commodity Exchange — Gold, Silver (calls) 
Thus, by mid-1977 the CFTC seemed to have a comprehensive set of 
regulations for the existing domestic and London option market and a 
pilot program for domestic options on regular futures exchanges. 
However, Schneider reported in May, 1977, that the CFTC was still leaning 
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very heavily toward requiring economic justification for each option 
contract — similar to the existing requirement for futures contracts 
( 95, p. 46). 
The CFTC during mid"1977 encountered various problems concerning 
the regulation of options. Schneider reports that the James Carr 
situation was the "straw that broke the camel's back" ( 98, p. 35). 
Schneider further reports that although Carr was in violation of the 
CFTC's ruling concerning registration, the CFTC was rebuffed in court 
in attempts to stop Lloyd, Carr and Company from trading options. Mean­
while, Lloyd, Carr grew to become one of the largest option dealers in 
the country..The company dissolved, however, after it was found that 
its founder Jim Carr was wanted by the FBI on several counts 
( 98, pp. 36, 37). 
Throughout the Lloyd, Carr problem the CFTC was facing limited 
resources, the courts' reluctance to act, adverse newspaper publicity, 
and pressure from Congress to do something. When the Lloyc\ Carr scandal 
broke, the CFTC felt pressure to drop the whole option business 
( 98, p. 37). They acted by banning London and domestic dealer options 
as of March 8, 1978. The ban was still in effect as of June, 1980 
( 76, p. 10). 
The CFTC still has a pilot program for domestic options on exchanges 
that was scheduled to go into effect by late summer, 1980 ( 98, p. 35). 
The most recent pilot program, as reported by Schneider (98, p. 35), is 
as follows: 
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1. Tightly controlled pilot program of up to three years. 
2. Both put and call options on the same commodity can l»e 
traded on the same exchange (that represents a shift 
in original thinking). 
3. Commodities and the designated exchanges for various 
options have not been selected but will come from the 
following suggested list of commodities eligible for the 
pilot program; sugar, lumber, plywood, cocoa, iced 
broilers, silver, copper, gold, platinum, GNMA.'s, Canadian 
dollars, Deutschmarks, Swiss francs, British pounds and 
T-bills. Applications will apparently have to be submitted 
and approved on an individual basis. 
4. For options to be traded on an exchange, the exchange must 
be designated as a contract market for that commodity — 
in other words, silver options could be traded only where 
silver futures are traded, 
5. Margining of premiums will probably not be allowed although 
a final decision has not been made. 
6. Dual trading and cross trading of options will be allowed. 
7. Time sequencing of option orders will be required. 
8. The reporting level is 25 option contracts. 
9. "Cold calls" — telephone solicitations to offer options to 
new customers will still be prohibited. 
10. Exchanges are not required to adopt segregation requirements 
for their members. 
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11. Options and underlying futures trading areas do not have to 
be physically separated as originally suggested. 
Currently, all option trading is banned, but the pilot program for 
exchange options appears to have some promise of being started during 
1980. Schneider, has a more pessimistic view as reported in March, 
1980 "... a domestic commodity options program could remain in limbo 
for some time" (98, p. 35). 
Stock Options 
History of stock option usage 
Although history records the early options as being written 
against commodities, the securities markets have made the largest contri­
bution to option development. Thomas and Morgan report that a well-
organized #nd rather sophisticated market in puts and calls existed in 
London during the 1690s (104, p. 21). Stock options fell into early 
disrepute, according tç Thomas and Morgan, and Barnard's Act of 1733 was 
passed which made stock options illegal (104, p. 61). 
Duguid indicates that the Barnard Act of 1821 almost caused the 
split of the London Stock Exchange (32, pp. 121-122). The Stock 
Exchange Committee outlined a new rule to ban options trading (already 
illegal) but "a large number of members rose in arms against the 
innovation" (35, p. 122). Malkiel and Quandt report that the Barnard 
Act was repealed in 1860 ( 83, p. 9). 
Thomas and Morgan write that option trading on stocks continued 
after the repeal of the Barnard Act in England but were banned during 
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World War II and 1958 (104, pp. 219, 224, 236). Stock options also 
existed in France, West Germany, and Switzerland, but London was the most 
important option exchange in the world for a long period of time 
(104, pp. 47, 141). 
Options on stocks in the United States enjoyed a somewhat more 
stable climate than in Europe. Duguld reports that the first mention of 
stock options in the United States was in 1790 ( 32, p. 10). Stock 
options have never been banned in the United States despite several 
attempts to do so, especially during the 1930s. A Congressional inves­
tigation during 1932-33 found that several of the financial abuses of 
the 1920s were strongly related to the use of stock options (32, PP-
37-41). Malkiel and Quandt relate the incidents that surrounded the 
Congressional hearing concerning the use of "pools" and "wash" sales by 
option dealers to manipulate stock prices (83, P- H) • Malkiel and 
Quandt further report on option regulation (83, p. 12): 
By 1934; following President Roosevelt's message 
to Congress of February 9 asking for legislation to 
regulate the stock exchange, the movement against stock 
options became even more intense. The Fletcher-Rayburn 
bill called for an outright ban on all stock options. 
Represented by Herbert Filer, the put and call 
brokers, whose very existence was threatened by the 
measures, protested vigorously, stressing the hedging 
uses of options and the beneficial functions these 
instruments served. The option dealers prevailed, 
and the Securities Act of 1934 did not forbid the use 
of options although the Securities and Exchange Commission 
was empowered to regulate them. 
The Put and Call Brokers and Dealers Association (PCBDA) was formed 
in 1934 as an outgrowth of the Congressional hearings. The PCBDA sets 
rules and regulations and has thus far done the job well-enough to 
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prevent the Securities and Exchange Commission from having to set its 
own regulations (83, p. 12). The stock option market in the U.S. is 
thus self-regulated. 
Stock option usage has increased dramatically since the 1930s 
(although not in comparison to the 1929-1933 boom period (83, p. 12)). 
Table 11 shows the growth of the stock option trade (83, p. 13). 
Table 11». Volume of puts and calls sold and relation to total volume 
on the NYSE, 1937-1968 
Puts Calls Total 
Ratio of Total Option 
Volume to NYSE Reported 
Volume 
(Percent) 
1937 754 1,492 2,246 .55 
1940 459 746 1,205 .58 
1945 801 1,307 2,108 .56 
1950 1,064 1,567 2,631 .50 
1955 2,246 3,766 6,012 .93 
1960 3,133 5,428 8,561 1.12 
1965 4,873 10,383 15,256 .98 
1968 8,187 22,099 30,286 1.03 
In the early 1970s about 3 percent of the NYSE volume had options 
written against the stock (83, p. 14). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission reports that stock option 
volume is related to the bullish or bearish activity of the stock market 
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because of profit potential, as illustrated below in Figure 6 
( 83, p. 21): 
SHARES MILLIONS INDEX 
150 10, 
120 
SEC Stock 
Price 
60 
30 
Option Sales 
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 
Figure 6. Stock price movements as compared to the volume 
of options traded, 1942-1960 ( 83, p. 15) 
Prior to 1973, stock options were traded over the counter by 
individual dealers. The Chicago Board of Trade founded the first 
exchange for the sole purpose of trading stock options in the name of 
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the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) (16, p. 91). By mid-1977, 
option volume was such that it amounted to approximately 50 percent of 
the volume of the NYSE (16, p. 94). Exchange trading of options, 
therefore, seems to be a contributing factor in the phenomenal 47-49 
percent growth (as a percent of NYSE volume) in option trading. 
Option pricing models 
The literature is rich with option theory and models of the behavior 
of option values. For the sake of brevity, since an exhaustive 
review would require several volumes, only the models widely accepted 
in the field will be discussed. Early empirical models and non-behav-
ioristic models will not be reviewed but are listed (6, 7, 10, 35, 41, 
46, 51, 56, 64). 
Since model notation differs, a uniform notation as developed by 
Smith ( 100, pp. 6, 7) will be used. The symbols are; 
t - current date 
t* - expiration date of the option 
T - time to expiration (t* - t) 
B - price of a default-free discount bond with a face value of 
one dollar 
C - price of an American call option at t 
c - price of a European call option at t 
kT k - expected average rate of growth in the call price [e = 
E (C*/C)] 
P - price ofan American put option at t 
P - price of a European put option at t 
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r - risk-free interest rate 
S - stock or commodity price at t 
p - expected average rate of growth in the stock or commodity price 
[e^^ = E (S*/S)] 
X - exercise price of option 
- value of portfolio A at t 
Starred variables such as C*, c*, S*, refer to prices at t*. Also, 
American options can be exercised before maturity (t*) whereas European 
options cannot. 
The following equilibrium conditions as developed by Merton 
(85, pp. 141-183) and outlined by Smith (100, pp. 7-14) are used as a 
comparison point for the various option pricing models and are presented 
without the accompanying mathematical proofs for brevity (for the mathe­
matical proofs see the above references). 
1. Call prices are non-negative 
2. At the expiration date, t*, the call will be priced at the 
maximum of either the difference between the stock price and 
the exercise price, S* - X, or zero. 
3. At any date before expiration an American call option must 
sell for at least the difference between the stock price and the 
exercise price. 
4. If two American calls differ only as to expiration date, then 
the one with the longer term to maturity, T^, must sell for no 
less than that of the shorter term to maturity, T^. 
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5. An American call must be priced no lower than an identical 
European call. 
6. If two options differ only in exercise price, .then the option 
with the lower exercise price must sell for a price which is 
no less than the option with the higher exercise price to avoid 
dominance. 
7. The common stock is at least equivalent to a perpetual call 
.(i.e. T = oo) with a zero exercise price. 
8. An American call on a non-dividend paying stock, will not be 
exercised before the expiration date. 
9. A perpetual option on a non-dividend paying stock must sell for 
the same price as the stock. 
10. The call price is a convex function of the exercise price. 
11. If the call price can be expressed as a differentiable function 
of the exercise price, the derivative must be negative and be 
no larger in absolute value than the price of a pure discount 
bond of the same maturity. 
12. With dividend payments on the stock, premature exercise of an 
American call may occur. 
The Bachelier model Bachelier advanced the first stock-option 
pricing model in 1900 (4, p. 47). The Bachelier model assumed "that 
the stock price is a random variable, price changes are independent and 
identically distributed, and that 
Prob {S = S*|S = S} = f (S* - SjT), (1) 
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where F is the cumulative distribution function of the stock price 
changes" (4, p. 47). Bachelier stated that (1) implies, 
F (S* - S.T) = N A* - (S + UT) I (2) 
^  \  o / f "  J  
where y - mean expected price change per t 
a - standard deviation in t 
N - cumulative standard normal distribution 
Therefore Bachelier'is model implies that 
C = E (C*) 5 /x (S* - X) N' (S*) dS* (3) 
with N' (S*) as the normal density function for S*. Smith (100, p. 48) 
further describes the model as: 
C = /x - S|a^ (.za^/T + S - X) N' (z) dz, (4) 
where z = (S* - S) a/?, and 
C  =  S  .  N  - X . N  r " (5)   r ^ l   
{_ j (_ av^ J 
•' M + a/ï 
where N { • } is the cumulative standard normal and N' { • } the 
standard normal density function. 
Smith lists the major objections to Bachelier's early model as 
( 100, p. 49): 
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1. the assumption of arithmetic Brownian Motion" in the descrip­
tion of expected price movements implies both a positive 
probability of negative prices for the security and option 
prices greater than their respective security prices for large 
T; 
2. the assumption that the mean expected price change is zero, 
suggesting both no time preference and risk neutrality; 
3. the implicit assumption that the variance is finite, thereby 
ruling out other members of the stable - Paretian family except 
the normal. 
What the Bachelier model really says is that the price of the call 
is a function of the variability of the security price over the life of 
the option. However, under an arithmetic Brownian Motion assumption 
the model tends to over or under estimate the value of the call because 
of the drift (skewed) nature of some securities' price over time. 
The Sprenkle model Smith ( 100, p. 16) reports that the Sprenkle 
model removes the first two objections of the Bachelier model. The 
basic Sprenkle model is of the form (100, p. 16); 
^Arithmetic Brownian Motion without drift implies that the 
probabilities of the stock price either rising or falling by one 
dollar are equal, independent of the level of stock price. Geometric 
Brownian Motion without drift implies that the probabilities of the 
stock price either rising or falling by one percent are equal, 
independent of the stock price. 
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E (C*) = /x (S* - L) L' (S*) dS* (6) 
where L' (S*) is a log - normal density function of security prices at 
maturities or reduces to 
E (C*) _ ePT S . N rin (S|X) + [p + (a^|2))l] (7) 
1 ] 
. M [in (Six) + [p - (g^l2)1Tl 
[ O/T i = X 
(8) 
Sprenkle also allowed for risk as: 
C = eP^ S • N j (9) 
= -(1 - k) X 
.  N [IN (S|X) + [p + (O^|2)]T] 
1 a/c j 
. N [in (Six) + [p - (a^|2)3T7 
1 \ 
(10) 
where k is the risk aversion parameter. Smith ( 100, p. 17) reports the 
model is still flawed because it lacks an allowance for the time value 
of money. 
The Boness model Boness (15. pp. 163-175) doesn't allow for risk 
aversion but does provide for the time value of money, as: 
C = e"^"^ /x (S* - X) L' (S*) dS* (11) 
or in Smith's form ( 100, p. 18); 
C  -  s • K  « 1 »  +  [p +  (12) 
(. A/R J 
= e-P'' X . N jl" (S|X) + [p - (<T^ |s)ll| 
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The Samuelson model Samuelson provides for both positive time 
preference for money, risk, and growth of option prices (100, p. 18), 
as: 
C . e(P - s . H [m (Six) + [p + (a^|2)]Tj 
a/r ( 
= e-^^ X 
• N |-
N IIn (Six) + [p - (a^|2)]Tj (15) 
Black and S choies (13, p, 640) as well as Smith ( 100, p.  20) argue 
Samuelson's model does not provide for complete market equilibrium. 
The Black - Schoies model The most widely regarded general 
equilibrium call pricing model seems to be the one developed by F. Black 
and M. Schoies in 1972. 
The basic Black - Scholes model takes the form ( 100, p. 22) : 
c = e"^^ E (c*) (16) 
= fr. (S* - X) L' (S*) dS*. (17) 
or solved as, 
c = S » N I In (S|X) + [r + (a^|2)]T| 
Îln (SiX) + [r - (a^|2)lT j a/r J = e"^^ X • N I I " ] ( (19) 
Thus, the Black - Scholes model shows that the price of a European call 
is a function of the following variables; the stock price, the exercise 
price, the maturity time, the risk-free interest rate, and the instanta­
neous variance rate on the stock price. All of the variables are 
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observable except the last (100, p. 23). This has made the Black -
Scholes one of the more popular models for empirical studies (12, 13, 
33, 100, 106). 
Smith further shows how the Black - Scholes model fits the Merton 
general equilibrium requirements (100, p. 24), as; 
1. As the stock price rises, so does the call price, 
= N [in (S|X) + [r + g^|2)]T] > ^ (gO) 
1 o/r j 
2. As the exercise price rises, the call price falls. 
= [in (Six) + [r - (a^|2)]T{,Q (21) 
^ I oA 1 
3. As the time to expiration increases, the price of the call falls, 
- Xe-rT I -A_ N fin (S|x + [r - (a^|2)]T 
3T " 2/r ^  ^ [• 
+ rN { In (S|X) +^(r (a |2)]T ^ | > q (22) 
4. As the riskless rate of interest rises, the call price rises. 
If - T • 
N In <s|x +^[r - (0 |2]T | > 0 (23) 
5. As the variance rate rises, so does the call price, 
is . Xe""^  r to (S|X) + [r - (o^|2)]l] A (24) 
^2 aVÏ J 2a 
65 
Many extensions of the Black - Schoies model exist (see Smith 
( 100, pp. 25-51)) as well as many tests plus a general model for puts 
that is very similar to the general call model (again see Smith ( 100, 
p. 34)). 
Commodity Options 
Unlike stock options, commodity options have had very little 
recorded research. It is interesting to note that history reveals 
canmodity options as the forerunner in option trading, and subsequently 
the mainstay of options until the advent of organized securities markets. 
Interest in commodity options dropped dramatically by the late seven­
teenth century and was revived only recently (1970s). 
With the revival in domestic commodity option trading in 1971, 
several articles appeared describing how to use the new option market 
and specifically the London options. London options were available for 
trading for several years prior to 1971 but traded only by a few people. 
Reiss presented one of the first articles on trading London options in 
1973 (92, p. 15). Reiss stressed the "... unlimited opportunity for 
gains with a fixed, relatively moderate risk," ( 92, p. 15). The 
article contains information on buying options, selling options, doubles, 
tax considerations, stop orders, and how to get started trading (92, 
pp. 16-17). The same article was rerun in Commodities in 1976 due to 
popiular demand (92, p. 15). 
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Jobman discusses how to evaluate commodity option firms and 
different trading approaches (74, p. 21). The ten criteria that 
Jobman stresses to use when trying to decide on an option dealer are 
(74, p. 20): 
1. What's the premium or markup? 
2. Does the firm shop around for costs? 
3. What kind of market research does the firm do? 
4. What kind of service will you get? 
5. What training is given brokers? 
6. What's the broker like? 
7. How does the firm watch your account? 
8. What's the execution time? 
9. Is the firm reputable, reliable, financially sound? 
10. Is the firm a member of NASOOD, FIA, etc.? 
Jobman further cautions the prospective buyer about using the amount of 
the premium as the sole criteria for picking a firm ( 44, p. 22). 
Most and Steur report on the American Stock Exchange's proposal to 
offer commodity options on gold and silver bullion via the actual com­
modities rather than futures contracts (88, p. 32). They also list 
some strategies and outline how industrial users can benefit from 
options on the actuals ( 88, p. 55). 
The Mocatta-type options are explained by Jarecki (73, pp. 31, 3 4, 
35). He indicates how the dealer options started and how they operate 
and can by used by hedgers. Jarecki later explained through an example 
how Mocatta actually underwrote and sold options ( 72, pp. 50^-54). 
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Sarnoff explains how to gain from granting or underwriting options and 
gives various schemes for doing so via various sophisticated strategies 
(93, pp. 34, 40^43). 
Miller details how to avoid many of the pitfalls of commodity 
option dealers and explains the risk involved (87, p. 3). 
Option pricing models 
The only accepted pricing model for commodity options known to 
currently be in use is the Black model. Black summarizes his model as 
(12, p. 170): 
w(x, t) = e^ ^ ^ [xN (d^) - C*N (d^)] (25) 
where 
w = option price 
X = futures price 
t = time period 
t* = expiration time 
C* = exercise price of option 
r = riskless rate of return 
2 
di = I In ^  + "I— (t* - t) ^1 
[• ^2^ 1 C *  "  2~ 
y s/ (t* -1) 
y/s/ (t* - t) 
This model is essentially the same as the securities option model 
for European type options that Black and Scholes developed (13, 
p. 177). The model simply says that the commodities option price is a 
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function of the futures price and the time period involved. The exact 
specification of the equation involves the statistical distribution 
assumptions of the futures price over time, i.e., its distribution 
moments. Black also points out that the model as developed does not 
work for options that can be exercised before maturity (American options) 
(12, p. 178). 
Gardner uses Black's model to formulate a similar model, as (53, 
p. 989): 
V/T . a- « 
In (P*/P 
- (P*/P^) N - I ^ 
where 
V/P^ = value of option relative to expected price 
P*/Pt = exercise price relative to the expected price 
t = time period 
r = riskless rate of return 
Gardner points out that Black's model was derived under random changes 
in the commodity price with changes distributed log - normally. The 
time series of agricultural commodity prices, however, is not random 
because of seasonal factors which securities lack (53, p. 989). 
Gardner also gives an example of how if the futures price P^ is 
known then P* and V can be generated and the log standard deviation of 
expected price, a, can be calculated. To illustrate, assume Pt=$3.00 and 
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an option to buy at P* = $3.30 sells for V = $0.30 with r at 0.05 for 
a 6-month option. Thus equation (26) will give a value of 0.36. This 
changes to 0.22 if V = $0.15 (53, p. 990). 
Gardner also states that if the futures price and the exercise 
(striking) price are equal then the option equation shows V/P^ depends 
only on a. Furthermore, observation of an option premium does not imply 
an estimate of a futures price (53, p. 990). Gardner does say that if 
two options are observed then inference can be made above the first two 
moments of the futures price distribution. His example shows that if 
the striking price of both a put and call option are equal, then (53, 
p. 990): 
Pr (P) • (P - P*) dP = Pr (P) • (P* - P) dP (27) O Jt ** 
or 
f" Pr (P) ' PdP = f° Pr (P) - P*dP (28) 
o o 
reducing to 
E (P) = P* expected price = striking price (29) 
Dunning provides one of the few explanations of how the Black model 
is practically used (33, pp. 44, 45). Eurocharts Information Service, 
London, England, has computerized the data for several years of the 
London commodity options and applied the Black model to calculate option 
values. The model is used by hedgers to determine whether or not to 
continue holding the option and, also, if the option should be purchased 
in the first place. Dunning uses a simple example as follows (33, 
p. 45): 
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Current price (May) of 
September cocoa 
Exercise price of 
option in May 
Premium 
Interest rate 
(riskless) 
Duration 
2000 British pounds 
2000 British pounds 
200 British pounds 
4 months 
The Black model yields the value of the option as 250 British pounds, or 
50 British pounds more than the premium. Thus, the firm should buy the 
option. Later in June the same option is: 
Current spot price 
September cocoa 
Exercise price of 
option 
Interest Rate 
(riskless) 
Duration 
2250 British pounds 
2000 British pounds 
^2 
3 months 
The model gives a value of 300 British pounds. This is compared with 
the foregone cash (50 British pounds) from not exercising the option in 
May and the premium 200 British pounds, or 250 British pounds cost to 
hold the option. Thus, the holding cost is 50 British pounds less than 
the expected value and the firm should continue holding the option. 
The principal problem In using the Black option pricing model is 
the seasonality factor that Gardner pointed out (53, p. 989). 
Black's model assumes random prices over the life of the option, that is. 
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prices are just as likely to increase as decrease. Use of the present 
Black model may generate biased option values. The literature does not 
contain any commodity option pricing models that overcome the problem of 
seasonality. 
Commodity Futures Hedging Strategies 
Hedging and futures markets have enjoyed a prolific representation 
in the literature since Holbrook Working began researching them in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s. Most of the research was confined to the 
traditional storable commodities such as wheat, corn and soybeans. With 
the introduction on November 30, 1964, of futures contracts for live 
beef cattle, new research was generated on non-storable commodities. 
Powers conducted a study to find if the introduction of live beef 
cattle and pork bellies futures had any influence on the cash prices. 
His results showed that cash prices stabilized (random element reduced) 
somewhat after the introduction of the non-storable futures contracts 
(89, pp. 460-464). Taylor and Leuthold conducted a similar study and 
found that annual variability of cash prices was reduced but not signif­
icantly; however, weekly and monthly variability were significantly 
reduced (103, p. 372). Leuthold, in a separate study, concluded that 
futures prices for live beef cattle estimated spot cash prices as well 
as com futures did for cash corn prices, despite the differences in 
storability (81, p. 382). 
Scheer found that hedging with live hog contracts could reduce risk 
and increase profitability. If the hedge was terminated, in a non-
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contract month, however, profit was reduced due to greater basis 
variation in non-contract months versus contract months (94, pp. 78-80). 
Leuthold evaluated the following eleven different hedging strategies 
for Illinois cattle feeders to determine the variance and mean returns 
(81, p. 15). 
1. Unhedged - sell on cash market 
2. Fully hedged - hedge every animal for every feeding period 
3. Hedge if the break-even value is less than the futures price 
4. Hedge if the break-even plus $.50/cwt. is less than the futures 
price 
5. Hedge if cash price is less than futures price 
6. Hedge if cash price plus $1.00/cwt. is less than futures price 
7. Hedge if break-even is greater than cash price 
8. Hedge if animals are to be marketed in the months of September, 
October, November, and December 
9- Hedge if animals are to be marketed in the months of August, 
September, October, November, December, and January 
10. Hedge if animals are to be marketed in the delivery months 
11. Hedge if animals are to be marketed in the non-delivery months 
Leuthold found that the first strategy had the highest variance and 
the second strategy the lowest. He found that strategies 4-7 had lower 
variances than the first with higher net returns (81, p. 18). 
also surveyed Illinois farmers and found very few actually used the 
futures market for live beef cattle (81, p. 24). 
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Holland, Purcell, and Hague suggested that cattle feeders use a net 
of selective hedging strategies. They list five hedging strategies that 
generate higher returns than not hedging or hedging in an unorganized 
manner (67, pp. 123-128): . 
1. Hedge if animals are to be marketed in the months September, 
October, November, and December 
2. Hedge if the target price (localized futures price) is less 
than the net mean return from no hedging 
3. Hedge if the target price (localized futures price) is greater 
than the net mean return from not hedging 
4. Hedge if the expected net revenue is less than the mean net 
return without a hedge and the target price (localized futures 
price) is greater than zero 
5. Hedge if prices decrease more than $l/cwt. during the feeding 
period 
Erickson simulated nine hedging marketing strategies for cattle 
feeders (40, p. 17): 
1. Unhedged - Sell on cash market 
2. Fully hedged - hedge all animals every feeding period 
3. Hedge if the cash price plus $l/cwt. is less than the futures 
price 
4. Drop the hedge if the cash price plus $1.50/cwt. is greater than 
the futures price. 
5. Hedge only in the delivery months 
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6. Hedge only in the non-delivery months 
7. If the break-even price is less than the futures price plus 
$l/cwt. don't hedge 
8. Do not feed if the break-even price is greater than the futures 
price 
9. If the break-even price is less than the futures price, hedge 
half of the production 
Thus, ErLckson's simulation allows for a non-feeding strategy. Results 
of the nine strategies showed that only strategies 7 and 8 exhibited 
positive net returns (both allow for non-feeding) (40, p. 19). 
Although numerous studies exist on livestock hedging strategies, 
they generally all generated results that had common ground. First, 
hedging usually results in a decrease in variance but not always an 
increase in net returns; and second, usually selective hedging strategies 
produce higher net returns than full hedges or routine hedges. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
A viable commodity options market must resolve several key issues. 
The major issues include the following; 1) should options be on 
futures contracts or on the physical commodity, 2) should options be 
traded on organized exchanges (such as the Chicago Options Exchange for 
securities) and/or by dealers in the actual commodity (such as Mocatta, 
Inc.)» 3) should options be developed to be resold ('strong') or should 
they not be freely traded ('weak'), and 4) should striking prices on 
options be fixed at certain levels or should striking prices by variable. 
Resolution of these issues is crucial to how the option market 
functions. Since no option market exists currently, assumptions about 
these issues must be made to establish a basis for the theoretical model 
and analysis. Each of these issues or problem areas is discussed in 
this chapter in some detail to provide information for decisions about 
analytical assumptions. 
Futures Versus Actuals 
Options on futures contracts function as detailed in Chapter 2. 
The procedures for buying and writing both puts and calls for actuals 
do not materially differ from futures contracts. For example, if the 
buyer of a call exercises his option he receives a long futures contract 
at the designated striking price. If the option was on the actuals he 
would receive the physical commodity instead of the long futures 
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contract. In the latter case he is long the cash commodity compared to 
being long the futures contract in the former, but a long position 
nonetheless. The writer, likewise, either delivers a long futures 
contract or the actual commodity if the option was written against the 
actuals. 
The major difference between the futures contract options and 
options on the actuals involves the put. As outlined in Chapter 2, when 
a put writer has the option exercised by the buyer, he delivers a short 
(sell) futures contract. If he wrote a put against the actuals, he 
receives the actual commodity if the put is exercised. The put on 
actuals, therefore, functions the way puts on securities work. In fact, 
this is one of the justifications AMEX lists for proposing using actuals 
rather than futures contracts (88, p. 55). The writer essentially is 
agreeing to accept a certain amount of the commodity at the designated 
striking price. The buyer of the put when it is exercised is short the 
actual commodity if it is against the actuals because he is selling to 
the writer. Likewise, if the put was on futures contracts he would 
receive a short futures contract and be short in the futures market. 
The buyer is in a short position regardless of the type of market. 
Since both the futures and actuals options leaves the buyer either 
in a short or long position if exercised, the question of which one to 
use can be more objectively analyzed by looking at the advantages and 
disadvantages of each. 
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Table 12 shows the relative advantage or disadvantage of each 
activity for options on futures contracts and actuals. Options on futures 
contracts relative to actuals are: 1) easier to deliver if exercised 
because it is merely an accounting transfer and broker call, 2) provi­
sions for grade, delivery points, and contract size are more uniform and 
already in use, 3) mor^ liquid and easier to transact orders, and 4) 
traded on organized, regulated exchanges. 
Options on actuals relative to futures contracts are: 1) more 
readily accepted by the general public because an option on a futures 
contract is difficult to understand, 2) more flexible for small producers 
or odd lots for contract size, delivery points, and grades, and 3) less 
costly in terms of margin deposits, margin calls, and brokerage fees 
(88, p. 55). 
These advantages and disadvantages, for the most part, don't differ 
enough to provide a clear choice of which should be used. The main 
difference involves the primary function of each market. The actuals 
market is a resource providing or resource releasing market. It is 
used primarily by participants that either need the commodity or need to 
get rid of the commodity. Options on actuals, therefore, have in the 
past been typically granted or bought by participants that • handle the 
physical commodity. They are essentially using the option as a price or 
risk shifting mechanism, but often times it is used as an assurance of a 
market — either a source of sale or purchase. To illustrate, Mocatta 
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Table 12. Advantages and disadvantages 
contracts and actuals 
of options on futures 
Activity 
Options 
Futures 
On 
Actuals 
Ease of delivery if exercised High^ LowP 
Liquidity and ease of transactions High Low 
Public understanding and acceptance Low ^fedium 
Extent to which individual needs 
and small lots are served Low High 
Organization and regulation 
of trading mechanisms High Low 
Costs of margin accounts, margin 
calls, and brokerage fees High Low 
Number of different types of 
commodities that can be traded Medium High 
Uniformity of grade, delivery 
points, and contract size High Low 
â. 
The terms High and Low are not used as absolutes but rather as 
a relative comparison between the two options . 
Metals, Inc. ( 72, p. 50) used options on actuals to establish a 
market for palladium. A foreign government was attempting to sell 
palladium for $70 per ounce when the market price was $66 per ounce. 
Mocatta purchased the palladium with the right to double purchase 
quantity anytime within the next year. Mocatta then sold options to 
industrial counterparts, metal merchants, and brokers who then sold them 
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to the public. A year later, four tons of palladium moved Into the 
United States at $70 per ounce, instead of the then market price of 
$135/ounce for a balance of payment savings of $8 million. 
AMEX in proposing in 1977 options on actuals listed three advan­
tages to industrial users: 1) provides a means of producing a return 
(premium) on non-income producing inventory, 2) permits hedging of price 
risks on a not-as-yet ascertained quantity of goods, and 3) price 
insurance (88, p. 55). 
Options on futures contracts attract a different clientele. 
Futures markets are used almost exclusively as price shifting markets 
(usually no more than 2 percent of the contracts are ever fulfilled by 
actual delivery (9, p. 7)). Option buyers and writers, therefore, 
want price insurance and price shifting protection with respect to 
cash and futures prices. This group constitutes a much larger popula­
tion than actuals users. In 1978, the value of agricultural commodities 
at the farm was approximately $75 billion and the marketing value was 
another $150 billion, whereas futures contracts on only a select group 
of these commodities was over $1 trillion ( 105). This $225 
billion dollar farm and marketing sector provides a larger volume need 
for options because they need price protection in addition to actual 
physical markets. 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission in early option trading 
proposals favored options on futures contracts partly because of the 
advantages and disadvantages discussed earlier, volume considerations. 
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and because of the problems of dealer versus exchange options (discussed 
in the following section). Undoubtedly when and if commodity options 
are allowed to be traded both futures contracts and actuals will be 
used. Currently, options on any futures contract are banned by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Some options on actuals are, 
however, being written by dealers such as Mocatta Metals, Inc. 
Dealers Versus Exchanges 
Closely related to the issue of futures versus actuals is the 
problem of dealers versus exclianges for trading options. In fact, the 
alternatives here are not clear-cut. Typically dealers have handled 
options on the actuals such as Mocatta Metals, Inc., but they also 
handled options on futures during their brief life in the early 1970s. 
Indeed, the scandal involving "Goldstein - Samuelson" (98, p.35) 
that wrote both actuals and futures options prompted early Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission rulings against dealers. Currently, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission's proposal would allow dealer 
options on the actuals if the dealer also traded the underlying 
ccsranodity. By the same token, early exchange trading proposals for 
options involved only futures contracts with AMEX being the exception. 
The two key issues concerning the controversy over exchange and 
dealer trading are in general: 1) Centralized pricing and 2) Regula­
tion and control. 
Centralized pricing has certain advantages from an economic theory 
standpoint. The more centralized the market place, the more 
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concentrated are the buyers and sellers and presumably the 
greater the understanding of supply and demand conditions. Many buyers 
and sellers and perfect knowledge of supply and demand are the two 
principle assumptions of a perfectly competitive market. However, 
centralized pricing has problems from a realistic and location theory 
standpoint. Centralized pricing of futures contracts has had a tendency 
over the years to diminish knowledge of local supply and demand 
conditions. A good example of this was the back hauling that occurred 
from Iowa to Chicago during the building of the interstate highway 
system through Iowa. Steel haulers competed for back hauls to Chicago 
for Iowa corn. Because of the centralized trading of corn futures in 
Chicago, the relative price in Iowa had little effect on the Chicago 
price. Only vhen the relative difference (basis) between the Chicago 
and Iowa price became large did the futures price respond. That is, 
the centralized trading responded to regional differences very slowly. 
Centralized futures markets, while fairly price effective in their own 
geographical areas (Chicago, New York, etc.), have been less effective 
from a pricing standpoint in the spatial, temporal, and form dimensions. 
The potential for arbitrage to be the stabilizer between markets is 
severely reduced when all pricing is centralized. This deficiency is 
reflected in the basis values which can vary widely such as occurred 
for corn and soybeans in the fall of 1973. Also, while more buyers and 
sellers are preferred from the viewpoint of competition, there is also a 
lower threshold on the number needed for a viable (active) market. The 
82 
Minneapolis and Kansas City Futures Exchanges stand as examples of 
markets that rival Chicago in pricing performance but with significantly 
fewer buyers and sellers. 
The cost of regulation and control is lower for exchange trading. 
Certain economics of size prevail in centralized regulation both in time 
and money expenditures. The old Commodity Exchange Authority and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission have considerable experience, 
investment, and expertise in regulating exchange trading of commodity 
futures. The cost of licensing, regulating, and overseeing a totally 
new dealer network is a major disadvantage of dealer trading. It has 
been argued that dealers should be free of most of the regulation and 
control just as other market places (county elevators, wholesale 
markets, and other trading centers). The aftermath of the early option 
market, the Lloyd, Carr scandal, and the Goldstein - Samuelson problem, 
cause serious doubts as to market performance if dealers are not regu­
lated. 
Indeed, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission lists centralized 
pricing and the cost of dealer regulation as the major criteria for 
supporting exchange trading (97, p. 60). The only serious challenger 
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's ban on dealers, Mocatta 
Metals, Inc. (Metals Quality Corporation, Rosenthal and Co., and Powdex 
have also challenged the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's ruling 
against dealers) argues that, "Logic and fairness require continuation 
of a business that has existed without problems" (72, p. 50). 
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'Weak' Versus 'Strong' Options 
'Weak' options are options that cannot be retraded. They must 
either expire or be exercised. 'Strong' options can be retraded and, 
like futures contracts, usually are never exercised. The current 
securities option trading on the Chicago Options Board Is in 'strong' 
options. 
A 'weak' option functions the way options were described in Chapter 
2. If a buyer of a call finds the price movement is enough to justify 
exercising the call, he does so. Likewise, if the price movement was 
against him, he would simply let the option expire. The writer of the 
call is also limited in what he can do. Once he writes the call, he has 
to wait for it to be exercised or expires. He does not have the right 
to purchase his call and nullify the option. 
If a 'strong' option was available, the buyer could do one of two 
tilings. He could exercise the call (treat it as a 'weak' option) or he 
could reenter the option market and sell the call option. The writer of 
the call also has the same privilege. If he sees the option may be 
exercised he can reenter the market and purchase his obligation and off­
set his option. 
As an example of a 'strong' option (Table 13), consider a naked 
writer who grants a 90 day call in December Live Cattle at $55/cwt for 
a premium of $5.50/cwt (assuming a 10 percent premium). After 60 days 
the price of December Live Cattle has moved to $59/cwt with definite 
technical and fundamental bullish signals. Rather than wait for the 
option to be "called" at $55/cwt, the writer could purchase his call 
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Table 13. 'Strong' option example for buyer and writer 
Writer Buyer 
'Naked' 90 day call 
is granted on December 
Live Cattle 
Received $5.50 
per cwt. 
Striking Price $55 
per cwt. 
Premium 
$5.50 per cwt. 
A 90 day call is 
purchased 
Paid $5.50 per cwt. 
Writer enters market 
and buys a call at 
a premium of $5.90 
per cwt. 
Writer has a net 
loss of $.40 per 
cwt. plus 
commissions 
minus interest 
60 days later 
Price at $59 
per cwt. 
90 days later 
Price at $63 
per cwt. 
Buyer calls at 
$63 - gets a 
futures contract 
at $55 for a gain 
of $8 less premium, 
interest, and 
commissions 
If writer did not repurchase 
after 60 days then he must 
enter the futures market and 
pay $63 for the contract. 
He delivers it to the buyer 
at $55 for a net loss of 
$8 less premium and interest 
plus commissions. 
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back for $59/cwt. at a premium of $5.90/cwt. (again, assuming a 10 percent 
premium), for a net loss of $.40/cwt. Why would a writer take a $.40/ 
cwt. loss rather than hold the option? Since it was a naked call and 
all signals were bullish he had a potential for a loss much greater 
than $.40/cwt. If at the end of 90 days December Live Cattle had 
advanced to $63/cwt., the buyer would call his option. The writer must 
deliver a long December Live Cattle futures contract — at $55/cwt. He, 
therefore, must enter the futures market and purchase a contract at 
$63/cwt, for a loss of $8/cwt. He received $5.50/cwt in premium for 
writing the call for a net loss of $2.50/cwt. (plus brokerage and miscel­
laneous costs) rather than $.40/cwt. if he would have purchased the call 
back at an earlier date. Of course, if his bullish prediction was wrong 
then he sacrificed a $5.50/cwt. gain for a $.40/cwt. loss because the 
option would not have been exercised. 
If the call was covered, the strategy would change. The writer 
would probably not repurchase his call. If it was exercised, he would 
deliver the long futures contract purchased at $55/cwt. He received the 
$5.5C/cwt. premium but suffered a $2.50/cwt. opportunity loss by writing 
the call. 
For a price decline, the strategy reverses for the writer. If the 
call was written naked, he would let the option expire and would have a 
net positive position of $5.50/cwt. less commissions. If the call was 
covered, however, and prices started moving down with strong technical 
and fundamental bearish signals he would consider purchasing the call 
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back. If after 30 days December Live Cattle was trading at $53/cwt. the 
writer could purchase his call for $53/cwt. at a premium of $5.30 for 
a net gain of $.20/cwt. He sacrifices the $5.50/cwt. premium for a 
$.20/cwt. gain because of the potential of greater losses. If he lets 
the call expire in 90 days and prices have fallen to $46/cwt. he must 
sell a futures contract for $46/cwt. to offset his 'covered* long for a 
loss of $9/cwt. (plus brokerage and miscellanous costs). He received 
$5.50/cwt. premium for a net loss of $3.50/cwt. 
Buyers, likewise, enjoy the same flexibility of repurchase as 
writers. If the buyer of the $55/cwt. call on December Live Cattle 
found prices at $59/cwt. 60 days later and technical and fundamental 
signals did not show any more increases, he might consider selling his 
call. If he sells his call at $59/c.wt. receiving a $5.90/cwt. premium, 
he has a net positive position of $.40/cwt. If prices had increased to 
$63/cwt. the writer by offsetting suffers an opportunity cost similar to 
the covered call writer. 
If the price had decreased to $51/cwt. with further indications of 
a decline the buyer could sell at $51/cwt. and a premium of $5.10/cwt. 
and have a net negative position of $.40/cwt. If he let it expire, he 
would have had a net negative position of $5.50 cwt. (his full premium). 
These foregoing examples assumed that the premium value was 10 
percent regardless of a price increase or decrease. Obviously this is 
not necessarily true. An option's value or premium reflects time and 
volatility (price value) (106, p. 18). The less time, the less 
value the option has (time decay). The more volatile, the greater the 
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chance (probability) for gain. By keeping the premium at 10 percent, 
it is assumed the loss in time decay value is offset exactly by the gain 
in volatility value. Although this typically doesn't happen, it does 
not invalidate the examples but merely adds simplicity. 
These examples point to one of the main advantages of 'strong' 
options over 'weak' options — that of allowing both buyers and writers 
the chanjce to reduce losses through different strategies. This is 
especially important for grantors who write naked options. By the same 
token it places a greater realization of opportunity costs upon the 
grantors and buyers. 
A 'strong' options market necessitates having enough liquidity so 
that writers and buyers can repurchase their obligations. Obviously if 
a writer wanted to purchase his call back some buyer must be willing to 
sell his call option. This process requires enough volume to generate 
a smooth process or else the 'strong' option rapidly looses its appeal 
and effectiveness. In a viable liquid form the 'strong' option market 
is completely analogous to the short and long offsetting concepts of 
the futures market. 
If the 'strong' option market is highly liquid, then fewer options 
will be exercised or let expire. This has been one of the overriding 
concerns of futures exchanges. They fear that a strong liquid option 
market would reduce futures volume and adversely affect that market. 
The fears are not groundless. The option exchanges for securities seem 
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to have had a negative effect on volume on the major stock exchanges 
(16, p. 102). The extent and nature of the effect is not fully known. 
A 'strong' option market necessitates specially educated traders 
because of the additional strategies and possibilities. This could 
have the effect of forcing more speculators and fewer hedgers to use 
the market, at least initially. 
Fixed Versus Variable Striking Prices 
Fixed striking prices are not truly fixed. Fixed pricing refers to 
setting various prices such as $55/cwt., $60/cwt., or $65/cwt. for a 
futures contract such as December Live Cattle. The striking price 
could be any of the above prices (say $55/cwt.) even though the current 
trading price for December Live Cattle is different, say $58/ cwt., the 
premium would then reflect the difference. If a buyer wanted a call on 
December Live Cattle he could get a $55/cwt. "in-the-money" option. His 
premium would be 10 percent plus the "in-the-money" amount, or $5.50/cwt, 
plus $3/cwt. for a total premium of $8.50/cwt. The buyer could have 
elected to buy a call at $60/cwt. This is an "out-of—the—money" call if 
the trading price is $58/cwt. The buyer would pay $6.00/cwt. minus 
$2.00/cwt., or $4.00/cwt. net premium for the "out-of—the-money" call. 
If the trading price is at one of the fixed striking prices, then the 
buyer could elect to buy an "at-the-money" call. If the trading price 
is $55/cwt. then an "at-the-money" $55/cwt. call would have a premium of 
only 10 percent, or $5.50/cwt. 
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In the securities option market a new option with a different 
striking price is introduced when the value of the stock reaches a 
midway point between two fixed levels (normally these levels are in 
multiples of five). If the stock traded at $50 but declined to $47.50, 
a new $45 option would be allowed to be traded. If it advanced to 
$52.50, then a $55 option would be allowed. 
The fixed striking price system allows for a large number of 
possible strategies for both writer and buyer. 
A covered grantor (writer) may wish to minimize the risk of having 
the commodity "called" away by the option being exercised. An effective 
way to do this would be for the writer to write an "out-of-the-money" 
call. If December Live Cattle are trading at $55/cwt. the grantor could 
write a call on the $60/cwt. option. His premium would be 10 percent 
of $55/cwt. or $5.50/cwt. minus $5.00/cwt. ("out-of-the-money") for a 
net of only $.50/cwt. This option would be less likely to be called 
than an "at—the-money" or an "in-the-money". The writer could further 
reduce the risk of the call being exercised by making the duration short, 
i.e., 30 days or 60 days. 
A covered writer may believe prices for December Live Cattle are 
going to be bearish. To take full advantage of this he could write an 
"in-the-money" call at $50/cwt. He would receive 10 percent of $50/cwt. 
or $5.00/cwt. plus $5.00/cwt. ("in-the-money") for a total premium of 
$10/cwt. The price of December Live Cattle would have to fall below 
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$45/cwt. before the writer would incur a net loss. Even if the writer's 
bearish prediction proved wrong and the call was exercised the grantor 
still had a net positive position of $5.00/cwt. 
Option buyers likewise can use the "in-the-money", "out-of-the-
money", and "at-the-money" contracts for different risk attitudes, price 
expectations, and commodity needs. For example, a risk averse buyer 
during a moderate bull market could buy a $45/cwt. call on December Live 
Cattle when the market price is $50/cwt. and rising. He has purchased 
an "in-the-money" option and pays 10 percent of $50/cwt. or $5.00/cwt. 
plus $5.00/cwt ("in-the-money") for a $10/cwt. premium. He has, there­
fore, purchased a $5.00/cwt. ("in-the-money") risk premium because, he 
could liquidate the call immediately and lose only his $5.00 premium, 
not the full $10.00 premium. 
Put option strategies for fixed striking prices for writers and 
buyers are similar but opposite in most cases. 
Fixed striking prices for options have the advantage of offering 
numerous different strategies. Because of this flexibility in strategy 
design, however, they have the disadvantage of requiring additional 
training and education. This eliminates otherwise potential option 
users. 
A variable striking price uses the current market as a guide for 
"striking" or setting the option price. If a buyer wanted a call on 
December Live Cattle and the market price was $55/cwt., the striking 
price would be as close to $55/cwt. as could be executed. In the 
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futures market a market order is typically never filled at the then 
market price because of trading lags. This would be true, also, for 
variable striking prices for commodity options. 
The uses and strategies of variable striking prices for buyers 
and grantors were covered in Chapter 2. All of the examples in that 
chapter assumed variable striking prices. 
With the variable striking price for an option being, for all 
practical purposes, the current market price a measure of simplicity and 
ease of use is gained over fixed striking prices. It also eliminates 
several potential strategies and flexibility of use. 
Option Markets 
The short lived United States commodity option market from 1971-
1973 and the proposed new option market by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission differ somewhat concerning the issues of striking prices, 
trading, and reselling. 
Table 14 shows the comparison between the early United States 
commodity options market and the currently proposed options market by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
The proposed Commodity Futures Trading Commission's option market 
is basically a trial market to determine weaknesses, viability, and 
regulation needs. Revisions in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's 
proposed market presumably could be made after the trial period. 
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Table 14. Comparison between the CFTC*s commodity option market 
and the early U.S. market, 1971-1973 
1971-1973 U.S. 
Market Commodity 1979 Proposed CFTC 
Situation Option Market Commodity Option 
Futures versus 
actuals contracts 
Dealer versus 
exchange trading 
'Weak' versus 
'Strong' options 
Fixed versus 
variable striking 
prices 
Futures 
Dealers only 
'Weak' 
Variable 
Futures (some 
actuals by certain 
dealers) 
Exchange trading 
(some dealer trading) 
'Weak' 
Variable 
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Several of the possible option market trading methods are 
not easily separable. Strong options need fixed striking prices to 
complement the flexibilities of retrade and strategy development. With­
out retrading, fixed striking prices pose severe trading problems and 
become less useful. Strong options with variable pricing, however, are 
possible and would increase the development of trading strategies. 
These are possible combinations and modifications that could occur after 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's trial period — depending on 
the success of the new market. 
The option market that will be assumed for this thesis will be the 
one proposed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The CFTC's 
proposed market will be used for two reasons : 1) Since the CFTC will 
control what kind of market will exist, an analysis using their proposal 
has more immediate relevance and use, and 2) the CFTC's proposed market 
is simple, more easily modeled, and offers the possibility of more 
powerful statistical inferences. 
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CHAPTER 5. HEDGING THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter deals with the theoretical development of options, 
hedging, and the simulation model used for the numerical analysis. The 
simulation model and the procedure for option and hedging calculations 
are described. The data base and the precise option and hedging 
strategies are developed and illustrated. 
Hedging Theory 
Hedging with commodity futures involves shifting the risk of 
unknown future spot price movements to traders willing to absorb the 
risk. Typically this is a speculator but it could also be another 
opposite position hedger. 
The effectiveness of a hedge can be measured by how well these price 
risks are eliminated. Blau's study in 1945 (14, p. 8) illustrates the 
point with Venn diagrams, (see Figure 7). 
A totally effective hedge (all price change risk eliminated) would 
be when both cash and futures risks offset each other — Position I. 
This perfect hedge, while possible, is highly improbable. The perfect 
hedge has the possibility of existing only when the cash and futures are 
mirror images in regard to quality, quantity, type, kind, etc., 
(66, p. 71). This has never been the case in any futures — cash 
relationship over a period of time (66, p. 75). 
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Position I Futures 
Position III Position II 
where: a = non-hedgable cash risks (grade change, natural 
disasters, shipping loss, etc.) 
3 = offsetting value (price change) risks 
Y = non-hedgable futures risk (exchange problems, 
contract problems, regulations, etc. 
Figure 7. Venn diagram representation of cash and futures risk trans­
fer 
A more correct theoretical development of hedging allows for the 
recognition of the differences between the cash and futures market — 
Position II. Only to the extent that g > y + a, will hedging reduce 
value change risk. Blau argues that y can be eliminated by such things 
as contract standardization for liquidity and efficient exchanges — 
Position III. This, however, is not theoretically correct. Blau 
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acknowledges this by stating that standardization of contracts reduces 
flexibility of exchange and therefore cannot negate the total effect of 
Y, but he does not develop the idea further. More correctly, then, the 
theory of hedging involves a diagram such as illustrated in Figure 8, 
Position IV 
where: G y + a 
Y _< a 
Figure 8. Venn diagram of an effective hedge 
This theoretical concept more completely reflects the present state 
of the art on hedging. Hedging comprises exchanging the risk of cash and 
futures price movements for basis movements, i.e., dg for da+dy. For this 
definition, however, a must be redefined and explained. Non-hedgable 
cash risks (a) embrace both individual and aggregate risks. Individual 
cash risks include loss of grade (rodents, moisture, and foreign matter), 
shipping and drying losses, etc. Aggregate cash risks would entail 
large natural disasters, transportation bottlenecks, and other factors 
that would be reflected in prices both in the cash and futures markets. 
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Individual risks for one point in time can be assumed small and constant, 
Ô. Hedging risk would thus be (1-6) a. + y, or basis risk. Over time 
this is d(l-ô) a + dy, or basis change as illustrated in Figure 9. 
5 
(1-5) Position V 
where: 6 + (1-6) = a 
Figure 9. Venn diagram of individual and aggregate risks in the cash 
market 
The risk in hedging then becomes whether 
6>^ (l-6)a + Y or d6>^ d(l-6) a + dy (30) 
offsetting risk (cash and futures price movements) d3 is greater than 
basis change d(l-ô) a + dy. 
An example may prove useful. Assume a producer has 38 head of 
cattle averaging 700 lbs./animal on feed. He plans to market in approx­
imately 150 days when the animals will weigh between 1,000 - 1,100 lbs. 
To protect against the possibility of a price decrease during the next 
150 days, the futures market can be used. 
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Table 15. Hedging table for a cattle feeder where basis change = 0 
Cash Futures Basis 
Jan. 1. Cattle on feed Jan. 1. Sell 1 contract $9.00/cwt. 
(cash spot at $60/cwt,) (40,000 lbs.) June fat 
cattle at $69/cwt. 
on May 1 when the cattle have reached market weight, the producer 
will lift the hedge. 
May 1. Sell fat cattle May 1. Buy 1 contract $9.00/cwt. 
on cash market $62/cwt. June fat cattle at 
$71/cwt. 
+ $2/cwt. - $2/cwt. A + 0 
I 1 
Net = 0 
The producer received $60/cwt. net — the futures market completely 
exchanged the risk of the cash price change (Position V, where d(l-ô) = 
dy = 0). This is not the same as Position I where a = y = 0, but rather 
where risks in futures and cash exist but the levels remain constant 
over some time. 
Basis changes due to the eroding of time, as time decays the 
probability of futures risk y and aggregate cash risk 1-6 decreases, 
resulting in a decrease in basis — theoretically because of time moving 
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the cash and futures together during expiration. With an eroding 
basis (often called an "improvement in basis" for short hedgers) the 
example becomes: 
Table 16. Hedging table for a cattle feeder with the basis narrowing 
Cash Futures Basis 
Jan. 1. Cattle on feed 
(cash spot at $60/cwt.) 
May 1. Sell fat cattle on 
cash market $61/cwt. 
Jan. 1. Sell 1 contract 
(40,000 lbs.) June fat 
cattle at $69/cwt. 
May 1. Buy 1 contract 
June fat cattle at 
$68/cwt. 
$9.00/cwt. 
$7.00/cwt. 
+ $l/cwt. 
I 
+ $l/cwt. 
I 
A$2/cwt. 
Net = $2/cwt. 
The improvement in the basis (reduction in unhedgable risk) causes 
a net increase from hedging, d& > d(l-ô)a + dy. The right hand expression 
d(l-5)a + dy can change many ways, i.e., d(l-6)a ^  o or dy o. The 
reduction in risk could be completely on the cash side, futures side, 
both, cash reduction but futures increase, or futures reduction and cash 
increase. The additive right hand expression only requires a relative 
change in unhedgable risks compared to hedgable risks (left hand 
expression). 
An improvement in basis typically occurs because of time, but other 
factors can outweigh this time effect. Aggregate cash risks can momen­
tarily increase because of a natural disaster, transportation impasses. 
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or other factors and overshadow the time factor. Futures risks can also 
cause this through contract and exchange default, regulatory injunctions, 
or market "corners". Either or both of these factors could cause the 
time factor to be outweighted and thus a basis increase, i.e., d6<(l-6) 
a + dy. The continuing example would show this as illustrated in 
Table 17. 
Table 17k Hedging table for a cattle feeder where the basis widens 
Cash Futures Basis 
Jan. 1. Cattle on feed Jan. 1. Sell 1 contract $9.00/cwt. 
(cash spot at $60/cwt.) (40,000 lbs.) June fat 
cattle at $69/cwt. 
May 1. Sell fat cattle 
on cash market $60/cwt. 
May 1. Buy 1 contract 
June fat cattle at 
$71/cwt. 
$11.00/cwt. 
$0/cwt. -$2/cwt. A$2/cwt. 
Net = -$2/cwt. 
These examples are for short hedgers and the opposite situation 
prevails for long hedgers. 
Hedging exchanges one risk for another. Absolute price movement 
in the cash and futures market (hedgable risk, 3) is exchanged for 
relative price movements in the cash and futures market (unhedgable 
risk, a and y)• 
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Option Hedging Theory 
Option hedging theory is analogous to futures hedging theory in 
that it involves shifting the risk of cash price movements and exchanging 
types of risk. The Venn diagram representation of option hedging theory 
is illustrated in Figure 10. 
Options right but not the obligation to trade futures contracts 
implies a purchasable (avoidable) portion of the risk of futures con­
tracts, 0 (the premium). 
An effective option hedge (the gain in the reduction of hedgable 
risk is greater than unhedgable risks) would be: 
dB > d(l-6)a + d(l-0)Y (31) 
Option Versus Futures Hedges 
The principal difference between futures hedging and hedging with 
futures through options is simply the ability to purchase a portion of 
the unhedgable risk. Theoretically an option hedge should have a 
smaller unhedgable risk factor than a futures hedge (given the same time 
span, commodity, cash position, and individual), or; 
(dg > d(l-6)a + d(l-6)Y) < (dB > d(l-6)a + dy) (32) 
or in reduced form: 
d(l-0)Y < dy (33) 
This latter reduced form expression holds only if the option and 
futures markets move and change exactly the same. In the absence of 
perfectly correlated movements between these two markets, the original 
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Options on Futures 
V (1-0) (1-5) ^  
where: a = 
Ô = 
(1-6) = 
B = 
Y = 
0 = 
(1-6) = 
Position A 
non—hedgable cash flûkâ (grade change, natural 
disasters, shipping loss, etc.) 
Individual cash risks 
aggregate cash risks 
offsetting value risks 
non-hedgable futures risk (exchange problems, contract 
problems, regulation, etc.) 
unavoidable futures risk 
avoidable (purchasable) futures risk 
Figure 10. Venn diagrams of cash and option risk 
103 
expression (32) more correctly shows the mathematical representation of 
the risks. With the two markets not in perfect synchronization the 
change in hedgable risks (dB) has the potential to be different for 
options than for futures since d3 reflects the magnitude of price 
volatility. The expressions need to be changed to d6° for options and 
d3^ for futures. Likewise, a and y have the potential to be different 
between the two markets since both non-hedgable cash and futures risks 
are functions of price variance, as: 
(a,-Y)=f <Sp,X) (34) 
where; 
a = non-hedgable cash risks 
y = non-hedgable futures risks 
P = price of the commodity 
X = other unquantifiable factors 
Cash risks (a) such as grade changes and natural disasters increase 
in size as the price variance goes up and vice versa. Also, futures 
risks (Y) such as contract rigidities and regulations increase in size 
as price variance increases and vice versa. The unquantifiable factors 
(X) are all other factors that affect risk. These are not discussed in 
detail but are included only for conceptual and mathematical complete­
ness. 
With a and y a function of price, a distinction between the two 
markets must be made since the values for a and y may differ due to 
price variance (a° and y° for options and and Y^ for futures). 
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Expression (32) then becomes: 
(d3°>d(l-ô)a° + d(l-e)Y°) > (dB^>d(l-ô)a^ + d ^)^ (35) 
Notice, however, that the total expression is now indeterminant with 
regard to sign. Allowing for imperfections within each market also 
nullifies the absolutes with regard to hedgable and unhedgable risks. 
Let (d3°>d(l-ô)a°+d(l-e)Y°) = (d3^>d(l-6)a^W = and 
re-express (35) as 
(36) 
It cannot now be argued a priori that X° < X^ because even if 
d(l-0)Y°< dy^ still holds (it theoretically does not now have to) other 
expressions may offset the magnitude of d(l-8)y° < dy^. For instance, 
d(l-ô)a^ < d(l-ôf may be greater than d(l-0)y°< dy^ and thus X°> X^, or 
d3° > d3^ or any combination of factors in expression (35). 
Objective and Hypotheses 
The final objective of this thesis is: 
Objective 3: Develop, compare, and test various hedging and 
option strategies in live beef cattle futures for 
^The expressions show > for both markets within the parentheses. 
This assumes an effective hedge as described in the text. A < sign 
could be inserted to allow for basis changes that reflect 
less effective hedges or offsetting hedges. This would not change the 
meaning or validity of expression (35). The > sign is retained within 
the parentheses only to emphasize the principal reason for hedging — 
to be effective. 
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a typical midwestern cattle feeder in terms of 
variance of prices received and mean gross returns 
from hedging. 
Variance of prices 
The variance of prices both in the cash and futures markets repre­
sent the risk involved with hedging. Without price variance there is 
no risk (except individual unhedgable cash risk and purchasable (futures 
risk))»thus equations (1) and (2) contain the risk expressions for 
price variance in the option and futures markets. 
The theoretical hypotheses are; 
Ho: [de°>d(l-Ô)a°+d(l-0)Y°]j<[d3^>d(l-6)a^+dY^] 
Ha: [d8°>d(l-6)a°+d(l-0)Y°]>[d3^>[d3^>d(l-ô)a^+dY^] 
the statistical or testable hypotheses are: 
2 2 
Ho:a < a -po - pf 
2 2 
Rata > O _ 
po pf 
Mean gross returns 
Gross returns from hedging with futures for producers ^ can be 
expressed as: 
IF - EF = -HîFT 
P P -
+NFT+RC -NHC=GR-
— p f 
2 
The expression changes somewhat for merchandisers who purchase 
initially in the cash market. 
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where 
IFp = initial futures price 
EFp = ending futures price 
NFT = net futures transaction 
RCp = releasing cash price 
NHC = net hedging costs (insurance, brokerage fees, etc.) 
GRj = gross returns with futures 
For hedging with options the equation would be: 
IS -ES -OP = -WOT 
P P -
+NOT+RC -NHC = GR 
— p o 
where 
ISp = initial striking price 
ESp = ending striking price 
OP = option premium 
NOT = net option transaction 
RCp = releasing cash price 
NHC = net hedging costs 
GR^ = gross returns with options 
If the option is not exercised, then IS^ and ES^ collapse to zero and 
the NOT is equal to the option premium (OP), or NOT will always be 
positive (OP), or NOT will always be negative under non-exercised options. 
There is no a priori theoretical basis to establish whether GR^< GR^, 
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GR > GR , or GR = GR^. It can be argued OP will constitute a larger 
of or
effect than IF -EP (106, p. 30) and thus GR < GR^, but this cannot 
P P ox
be argued from a purely theoretical basis. From an empirical basis it 
has some validity because of the tradeoff usually observed between 
variance and returns. As variance (risk) is reduced so (usually) is 
return ( 103, p. 29); only from this rather incomplete basis can the 
theoretical hypotheses be stated as: 
Ho:GR < GR-
o — r 
Ha:GR > GR-
o r 
and the testable statistical hypotheses: 
Ho:iiGR^ SlGR^ 
HacyGR^ >UGR^ 
Testable hypothesis for objective 3 
The aggregate testable hypotheses involving both variance (risk) 
and mean gross returns are; 
UGR < yGR. 
X 
2 2 
Ha:a^  > a\ po pf 
GRo> yCR^ 
Each segment, however, will be tested separately. 
Model, Hedging Strategies, and Data Base 
A simulation model will be used to test the hypotheses. This model 
will be used to place and lift both option and futures hedges over 
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historical prices to recreate (simulate) what would happen to price 
variance and mean gross returns. 
Assuming an efficient market, one simple strategy of a complete 
hedge could be used as a test for yGR^ _< liGR^ since an efficient market 
2 2 
would automatically yield a "fail to reject Ho" for _< There­
fore, one hedging strategy placed over the historical time frame would 
yield an appropriate mean gross return test — if the market is efficient. 
Several studies, however, reject the efficient or random walk market 
idea. Cargill and Rausser (18), Houthakker (68, 69), Leuthold (81), 
Smidt (99), and Stevenson and Bear (101), present results that reject 
random walk markets or reveal the presence of increased gross returns 
when appropriate strategies are used. 
This does not necessarily imply all futures markets are non-random. 
Indeed, a considerable body of empirical research shows random walk or 
more sophisticated martingale models do not disprove efficient markets 
for certain commodities (Cargill and Rausser (18), Gray (61), Powers 
(89), and Working (110), to name only a few). The conflicting nature of 
the research necessitates at least an elementary use of difference 
strategies (mechanical filters) to test for increased gross returns. 
2 The presence of increased gross returns will effect yGR and since 
non-symmetric price variance causes unequal price moves. 
Simulation model 
The model is designed to simultaneously place both a futures and 
option hedge and lift the hedge at the designated time. During this 
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active hedge time the model calculates the interest costs on margins, 
margin calls, and option premiums and makes appropriate deductions for 
brokerage fees. Therefore, for each strategy tested the futures and 
option hedge will be retained the same length of time. Figure 11 shows 
the flow diagram of the simulation model. 
Assumptions 
The model is constrained by several assumptions regarding options, 
futures, interest rates, premiums, and other costs for the sake of 
simplicity. Hone of the assumptions critically impare the model's 
functions or applicability to the basic objective. 
Futures The Live Cattle Futures contract as traded on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange will be used as the basic contract. It calls 
for 40,000 lbs. of USDA Choice cattle (approximately 38-40 head). 
Trading months include February, April, June, August, October, and 
December. The exchange allows for l/4v/lb. as the minimum price 
fluctuation and 1.5<?/lb. as the maximum or limit move per trading day 
(9:05 A.M. to 12:45 P.M. Central Time). 
Options The type of option market assumed for the simulation 
model will be based on data presented in Chapter 4. The option market 
will have the following characteristics: 
1. Options will be written against futures contracts, not the 
actual commodity. Thus the option will be written against 
one of the futures contracts outlined previously. 
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Options 
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Futures 
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Buy Put 
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Futures 
Contract 
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Costs > 
Market 
Hedging 
Costs > 
Figure 11. Flow diagram of simulation model for futures and 
option hedges 
Ill 
2. Major trading of the options will be by exchanges, not dealers. 
The issue of dealers versus exchanges would not substantually 
alter the model, but an exchange is assumed for uniformity of 
price reporting. 
3. * Weak' options are assumed for simplicity. Once an option is 
bought it must either be exercised or allowed to expire without 
the possibility of resale. 
4. Variable striking prices will be used. Without any evidence 
to base fixed striking prices upon, the variable striking 
price reduces unnecessary statistical bias. Arbitrary fixed 
levels introduces another unexplainable variable and therefore 
another unaccountable statistical white noise in the error 
term. 
Interest, brokerage fees, premiums and other costs 
Interest will be charged daily against option premiums, margins, 
and margin calls for futures contracts at an annual rate of S percent 
(this is a weighted average of prime rates over the data frame). 
Brokerage fees for transacting a futures contract will be $50 
per roundturn and likewise for an option contract. 
Option premiums will be a variable parameter, and will be calculated 
as a percentage of the value of the contract. The percentages- will be 
varied over each strategy and will include 5 percent, 10 percent, and 
15 percent ( 33, p. 46). 
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Producer 
A mldwestern cattle feeder Is assumed as the decision unit. The 
producer buys fairly light feeders (600 lbs.) and feeds them 180 days 
with an average daily gain of 2.75 lbs. The animals weigh 1,095 lbs. 
at the end of each period and grade choice. Four percent pencil shrink 
is assumed and a 2 percent death loss. The producer places 40 head in 
the pen at the beginning of the feeding period and markets 39 head, 
or approximately 40,000 lbs. (size of one futures contract). Live 
cattle are sold on the cash market at Omaha, Nebraska. 
Data base 
Figure 12 shows the cattle cycle from 1892-1980. The last four 
complete cycles have oscillated in 10 year intervals. The last complete 
cycle was from 1965-1975. Live Cattle Futures began trading on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange on November 30, 1964 for the April 1965 
contract. Thus for hedging purposes, data earlier than 1965 cannot be 
used. 
To fully incorporate a complete cattle cycle the time frame for the 
simulation model will be January 1, 1965 until December 30, 1977 encom­
passing 13 complete years of cash and futures prices. 
Using data from 1965 to 1977 incorporates a liquidation phase 
(1965-1969) and an expansion phase (1969-1975). An additional two years 
of liquidation in the current cycle are also included (1975-1977). 
Daily cash and futures closing prices will be the price information 
used. A new feeding period is assumed to start at the beginning of 
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Figure 12. Cattle cycle for all cattle from 1892 to 1980 in the U.S 
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each month. The prices were assembled from the Wall Street Journal 
and the Market News Service, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
Futures and Option Strategies 
Selection of mechanical filters (strategies) necessitates having 
the futures strategy and the option strategy as comparable as possible 
to avoid additional white noise statistical bias. This constrains the 
use of strategies that involve selective place-lift hedges. While 
futures can be readily offset and initiated, options because of the 
particular time length and the assumption of 'weak' trading cannot be 
offset. 
Five different futures strategies are used with two option 
strategies for each futures strategy plus a double option strategy for 
a total of 16 different strategies. 
Futures strategies 
Filter 1. A full hedge is initiated by selling a futures contract 
at the beginning of the feeding period and retained 
throughout. When the cattle are sold on the cash 
market the hedge is lifted by buying a futures contract. 
During the time the hedge is maintained, if margin 
calls are made, interest on the extra margin is calcu­
lated. The gross return is calculated as: 
C +(BF -EF )-HC = GR, 
P P P 1 
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where 
Cp = cash price received when cattle 
are sold on the spot market 
BFp = futures price at the beginning of the feeding 
period (what the contract was sold for) 
EFp = futures price at the end of the feeding 
period (what the contract was bought for — 
i.e., offset) 
HC = hedging cost which includes interest on 
initial margin, interest on margin calls, and 
brokerage fees. 
GR^ = gross returns from hedging. 
The mean gross returns from using Filter 1 over the 
data set are calculated as : 
n 
i-jGR^/n = UGR^ 
where 
n equals the number of different times 
Filter 1 was used over the 13 years of data. 
Filter 2. A full hedge as in Filter 1 is placed only during a 
feeding period when the cattle are finished during a 
delivery month. Gross and mean returns are calculated 
as in Filter 1. 
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A full hedge as in Filter 1 is placed during a feeding 
period when the cattle are finished during a non­
delivery month. Gross and mean returns are calculated 
as in Filter 1. 
A hedge is placed only if at the beginning of the 
feeding period the basis is at least $1.00/cwt. Gross 
and mean returns are calculated as in Filter 1. 
A hedge is placed only if at the beginning of the feed­
ing period the basis is at least $1.50/cwt. Gross • c. 
and mean returns #re calculated as in Filter 1. 
Option strategies 
Filter la. A full hedge is initiated by buying a put option at the 
time the cattle are placed on feed. The option is 
allowed to expire when the cattle are sold on the cash 
market. Gross returns are calculated as: 
where 
Cp = cash price received when cattle are sold on 
the spot market. 
Op = option premium paid for put option 
= hedging cost which includes interest on the 
option premium and transaction costs. 
GR. = gross returns from hedging with filter la. 
Filter 3. 
Filter 4. 
Filter 5. 
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Filter lb. A full hedge is initiated by buying a put option. The 
option is exercised at the time the cattle are sold. 
When the option is exercised a short futures is obtained 
and offset by buying a futures contract at the current 
futures price. Gross returns are calculated as; 
C +(BS -EF )-0 -HC., = GR,, 
p p p p lb lb 
where 
Cp = cash price received when the cattle are sold 
on the spot market. 
BSp = striking price of put option (price of the 
short futures contract) 
EFp = price of the futures contract used to offset 
the exercised option. 
Op = option premium paid for the put 
= hedging costs which include interest on the 
option premium, margin, money, brokerage fees, 
and transaction costs 
GR^^ = gross returns from hedging with Filter lb 
For Filter la and lb the mean gross returns are calcu­
lated as: 
and 
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Filter 2a. A full hedge is placed only when the cattle are 
marketed during a delivery month. A put option is 
purchased at the beginning of the feeding period and 
allowed to expire. Gross and mean returns are calcu­
lated as in Filter la. 
Filter 2b. A full hedge is placed only when the cattle are 
marketed during a delivery month. A put option is 
purchased at the beginning of the feeding period and 
exercised when the cattle are sold. Gross and mean 
returns are calculated as in Filter lb. 
Filter 3a. " A full hedge is placed as in Filter 2a except it is 
placed during non-delivery months instead of delivery 
months. 
Filter 3b. A full hedge is placed as in Filter 2b except it is 
placed during non-delivery months instead of delivery 
mOûtuS. 
Filter 4a. At the beginning of each feeding period a put option is 
purchased only if the cash and futures differ by at 
least $1.00/cwt. Once placed the hedge is maintained 
and the option is allowed to expire. Gross and mean 
returns are calculated as in Filter la. 
Filter 4b. If the basis is at least $1.00/cwt. at the beginning of 
the feeding period a put is purchased and exercised at 
the end. Gross and mean returns are calculated as in 
Filter lb. 
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Filter 5a. A put option is purchased at the beginning of the 
feeding period only if the cash and futures differ 
by $1.50/cwt. If the hedge is placed it is maintained 
until the feeding period is ended and the option is 
allowed to expire. Gross and mean returns are 
calculated as in Filter la. 
Filter 5b. If the basis is at least $1.50/cwt. at the beginning 
of the feeding period a put option is purchased and 
exercised when the feeding period is over. 
Filter 6. This is the double option strategy. A double option 
is purchased at the beginning of each feeding period. 
It is exercised as a put option when the gain is more 
than the variable hedging costs and as a call option 
when the gain is greater than hedging costs. 
Filters 1, la, and lb have as their rational the idea behind a 
"complete" hedge. That is, the hedge is placed when a cash position is 
entered (cattle placed on feed) and maintained until the cash position 
is liquidated (feeding period ended). This allows for the possibility 
of the futures or options on futures to offset the cash price movement. 
A cash strategy is provided as a basis for comparison on how well this 
idea works. 
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Filters 2» 2a, 2b, 3, 3a, and 3b are used to allow for the possi­
bility of imperfections due to the absence of a complete set of trading 
months. Having to hedge with a contract that does not expire until after 
the marketing period adds an extra time variable that may influence price 
variance and gross returns. 
Filters 4, 4a, 4b, 5, 5a and 5b are used to test for the effect of 
difference levels of basis. With a short hedge or put option the basis 
needs to narrow for expected gross returns to increase over Filters 1, 
la and lb. By placing a hedge only when the basis is at a certain 
width, the addition to gross returns has a higher probability of 
occurring. This probability increases because of the market forces that 
bringscash and futures together as time expires. 
Filters 1-5 were also selected because similar filters were tested 
by Leuthold (81), and Erickson (40), on Live Cattle. This allows 
for comparisons and checks although the data periods differ. 
In addition to the put options used for Filters la,b-5a,b a Double 
option will be purchased as an additional strategy. While this double 
option strategy is not necessary to test the formal hypothesis, it does 
provide additional information about the possible uses for options as 
hedging mechanisms. 
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Complete and Partial Feeding Activities 
The simulation model used to generate gross mean returns and 
variance of selected hedging strategies for futures and options was also 
used to evaluate two completely different feeding activities. The 
Complete Feeding Activity is the analysis of major importance, but a 
Partial Feeding Activity was also analyzed. The CFA simulation assumes 
that the feeder places a pen of cattle on feed at the beginning of each 
month for the entire data period. The cattle are either hedged with 
futures contract, an option, or unhedged depending on each strategy. 
Under the PFA, however, the feeder may or may not place a pen of cattle 
on feed at the beginning of each month. This provides in addition to the 
strategies of hedging or remaining unhedged a choice of either feeding 
or not feeding. 
Details of the Model 
For futures hedges, an initial margin deposit of $1,000 per contract 
was assumed (this is a realistic value that generally prevailed over 
the time frame). The maintenance margin was set at $700 per contract. 
A price move of .75 /cwt. or more triggered the maintenance margin and 
the margin account was brought back to $1,000. Interest was calculated 
for the entire feeding period on the initial $1,000 margin plus any 
margin calls. Interest was assumed to be 8 percent per year or 
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.000222 percent per day. Brokerage fees were assumed to be $60 per 
contract or .15 per cwt. for both a futures contract roundturn and an 
option contract. If an option was exercised then a charge of $120 or 
.30 per cwt. was charged due to two brokerage transactions. 
Premiums for the option contracts were set at 5 percent, 10 percent, 
and 15 percent of the striking price at the beginning of each feeding 
period. For each of the three premium values the simulator was used 
throughout the entire data period (1965-1977). The early U.S. commodity 
options market had premiums which typically varied between the 5 percent 
and 10 percent range. The London commodity option market also shows pre­
miums which vary between the 5 percent and 10 percent range. The sketchy 
evidence of the early U.S. option market and the London option market 
shows a 10 percent premium to be the most prevailing premium charge. 
The simulator placed the cattle on feed the first Friday of each 
month and carried them on feed for 27 weeks. According to each strategy, 
if the cattle were to be hedged, the futures contract for the month 
following the month when the cattle would be sold was used. For example, 
the first feeding period started on January 8, 1965 and ran 27 weeks 
until July 9, 1965. Since the cattle came off feed in July, the next 
futures contract was August. So August live cattle was the contract 
used for hedging both by futures and options. This is a standard 
hedging procedure to avoid erratic delivery month price relationships 
( 81, p. 881). 
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For the normal futures hedges the sequence of the simulation model 
(as outlined in Chapter 5) was: 1) the cattle were placed on feed on the 
first Friday of each month, 2)] if hedged, a futures contract was sold 
for a delivery month beyond the last month on feed, 3) an initial margin 
of $1,000 was deposited and margin calls made if a $.75 pr cwt. or 
greater price move occurred during the 27 weeks on feed, 4) an 8 percent 
opportunity cost was charged for the initial margin and all margin calls, 
5) the feeding period ended on the Friday of the 27th week, 6) the futures 
contract was bought back and the cattle sold on the cash market in 
Omaha the same day, 7) the gross return was calculated by subtracting 
costs of the margins and the brokerage fees and the profit or loss from 
the futures transaction, 8) steps 1-7 were repeated each month during 
the 1965-1977 period for 150 different feeding periods, 9) variance of 
these gross returns was calculated as well as the overall gross mean. 
The option hedge sequence for the simulation model was: 1) the 
cattle were placed on feed on the first Friday of each month, 2) if 
hedged, a put option was purchased the day the cattle were placed on 
feed for a delivery month beyond the last month on feed, 3) the option 
premium was calculated as 5, 10, or 15 percent of the striking price 
(futures price) at the beginning of the feeding period, 4) the feeding 
period ended on the Friday of the 27th week, 5) the option was either 
exercised or allowed to expire depending on the strategy, 6) if allowed 
to expire, the cattle were sold on the cash market in Omaha and gross 
returns were calculated by subtracting the premium cost and $.15 per cwt-
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brokerage fees from the cash price, 7) if exercised, the cattle were 
sold on the cash market in Omaha and gross returns were calculated by 
subtracting, the premium cost and $.30 per cwt. brokerage fees from the 
cash price. By exercising the put option, a short futures was obtained 
and therefore offset the same day with a long contract. The profit from 
exercising the put was added to the gross return (the option was not 
exercised if the profit was less than brokerage fees ($.15/cwt.)), 8) 
steps 1-8 were repeated each month during 1965-1977 for 150 different 
feeding periods, 9) variance of these gross returns was then calculated 
as well as the overall gross mean. 
For double options the simulation sequence was: 1) the cattle were 
placed on feed on the first Friday of each month, 2) a double option was 
purchased for a delivery month beyond the last month on feed, 3) the 
option premium was calculated as 10, 20, or 30 percent of the striking 
price at the beginning of the feeding period, 4) the feeding period ended 
on the Friday of the 27th week, 5) the option was exercised if the 
profit was greater than brokerage fees of $.15 per cwt., 6) if the 
futures price at the close of the feeding period was less than the 
striking price by more than $.15/cwt. the double was converted to a put 
and exercised, 7) if the ending price was greater than the striking 
price by more than $.15/cwt. the double was converted to a call and 
exercised, 8) the profit from exercising the option was added to the 
Omaha cash and premium and brokerage fees of $.30/cwt. were subtracted 
to get gross returns, 9) steps 1-8 were repeated for each month 
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during 1965-1977 for 150 different feeding periods, 10) variance of 
these gross returns was calculated as well as the overall gross 
mean. 
The Partial Feeding Activity utilized the same simulation sequence 
except for the first step for futures, options and doubles. The first 
step was changed to: 1) Cattle are placed on feed on the first Friday 
of each month if the criteria for each strategy was met (i.e., non­
delivery month, delivery month, $1.00 beginning basis, or $1.50 beginning 
basis). If the strategy criteria was not met, then no cattle were 
placed on feed. That is, for the non-delivery month strategy if the 
cattle could be finished during a non-delivery month they were hedged, 
if not, no cattle were placed on feed. The remaining steps of each 
sequence were the same. 
Tests of significance 
One of the purposes of using a large data set (1965-1977) and 
incorporating a time span long enough to cover any cyclic movement was 
to invoke the Law of Large Numbers or the Central Limit Theorem. By 
having a large enough data set, tests involving normal populations can 
be used. As Lentner states, "The assumption of normality is not criti­
cal and may be relaxed when making inference about the mean of any 
population so long as the sample size is sufficiently large" (80, p. 
143). Lentner further states, "For continuous random variables having 
symmetric distributions, samples of size 20 or more are generally 
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sufficient" (80, p- 143). The sample size for the Complete Feeding 
Activity was 150 and for the Partial Feeding Activity never less than 51. 
Tests of variance equality 
The sum of squares of independent standard normal variables has a 
special distribution called a chi-square distribution, thus, 
A: 
i=l ^ 
is a chi-square variable with n degrees of freedom if 2^, 3^, 
are independent N(0,1) variables (80, p. 140), 
= (n-l)S^/a^ = SS/a^ 
In testing two populations it follows from the above equation that, 
^ «1-1 " SSi/Oi and = sSg/Cg 
The variance-ratio Is obtained by, 
I1-. tl^ 1 0 0 
Under the hypothesis of equal variance the right hand side of the above 
equation reduces to a ratio of sample variances and becomes a test 
statistic. 
For testing the hypothesis of objective 3 of 
2 2 
Ho;a > a. 
o — f 
2 2 
Rata < a. 
o f 
2 ,„2 under Ho, . g'/S 
12 7 
so Ho is rejected if 
1, ^ Hg—1; 1-a 
Tests for gross mean equality 
Two population testing of random samples to compare and Ug 
reveals the following: 
Xi. ~ »(Wl. 
X2. ~ "(Wj, o^/nj) 
Xl.- X2. ~ H(U^-«2. 
where n^ and n^ are the respective sample sizes ( 80, p. 199). 
Testing for equality of gross mean returns requires two tests. 
First, a test for the equality of means when the variances are unknown 
but estimated and equal. Secondly, a test for equality of means when 
the variances are unknown but estimated and unequal. 
Testing when the variances are equal and estimated involves using a 
Student T test (because of the estimates) and using a pooled estimator. 
2 
The pooled estimator, denoted as is: 
2 Pooled SS _ ®®1 ^^2 
p Pooled df (n^-l)+(n2-l) 
or in standard error form as. 
S = S /v^ 
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S- = Sp//:; 
*2. 
3  =  S  V T +  1  
' •»! »2 
thus to test for 
HotyGR > liGR^ 
o — f 
H&: GR < GR, 
o f 
where Ho is 
T ~ XO 
"1 + "2-2 - — 
1 ^2 
When the variances are unequal, the Behrens-Fisher technique must be 
used. This formula is 
^1 ^  
"l ^2 
To test for 
where Ho 
HoriiGR^ 2 uGRj 
Ha;uGR^ < yGR^ 
= ^1. ~ 5. 
T3 
^1 ^2 
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Ho is rejected if 
this requires, however, that t^ be weighted means of the regular Student 
T points as defined by 
+ Vn^-l' I + "2> 
W. = S?/n. for i = 1, 2 
1 X X 
In making the tests of significance to test for equality of 
variances and mean gross returns, first the test for equality of 
variances was made. If Ho was rejected then the Behrens-Fisher test was 
used for gross mean return testing, otherwise the normal Student T test 
was used. 
Testing for equality of variances and means with these tests implies 
independent populations. This assumption is not invalidated in testing 
between futures hedges and option hedges. These two populations are 
independent end the previously outlined tests are appropriate. Since 
these are the populations of major importance,the results and interpre­
tations will rely heavily upon these test results. However, the other 
tests involving hedging strategy differences and option strategy 
differences may be biased statistically since these populations are not 
completely independent. For example, a test for equality bf means and 
variance between a full hedge and a different hedging strategy (such as 
non-delivery months) carry at least some of the same price information 
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(data points) — thus non-independence. The number of observations that 
are different between the full hedge and partial hedging strategies is 
large so the non-independence factor is relatively small. This does, 
however, place these tests on a lower reliability level compared to 
the major futures verses options tests. The tests are calculated and 
reported only as a guide and further interpretations should bear this 
in mind. 
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
Table 18 shows the mean gross returns and variances for futures 
hedges and the three option hedges (5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 per­
cent) . It also shows the tests of significance for variances (F values) 
and gross mean returns (t values). Figures 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, show 
the graphical representation of variance and gross mean returns. For 
each futures strategy there are two option sub-strategies; 1) & naive 
option strategy where a put option is purchased but is always allowed 
to expire, 2) the option is exercised if a profit greater than 
exercise costs ($.15/cwt.) can be realized. They will be referred to as 
the naive and rational strategies respectively. 
Full Hedge Strategy 
The variance of gross mean returns for a full futures hedge over 
150 feeding periods is $59.26 per cwt. and the gross mean return is 
$34.19 per cwt. (Table 18). For the typical 10 percent option 
premium and the rational sub-strategy (2) the variance is $55.74 per 
cwt. and a gross mean return of $32.76 per cwt. 
Although numerically the variance is lower for an option 
hedge, statistically the difference is not significant at the a = 10 
percent level. Therefore, a fail to reject Ho results. There is no 
evidence at the 10 percent level of significance that the variance of 
futures hedges is greater than a 10 percent option hedge. 
Table 18. Tests of significance for futures hedges and option hedges 
for the complete feeding activity 
Options 
neagxng 
Strategy 
^.05 t* ^.10 t ^.15 t 
Full Hedge 
Og =59.26 (1) 33.17 1.19 31.45 3.26 29.71 5.43 
Uy=34.19 (2) 34.48 .32 32.76 1.63 31.03 3.69 
Non-Delivery 
Gg=66.65 (1) 34.09 1.11 33.21 1.67 32.32 2.63 
Ujj=34.71 (2) 34.86 .16 33.97 .81 33.10 1.76 
Delivery 
(7^=54.74 (1) 34.11 .45 33.27 1.43 32.42 2.41 
Py-34.49 (2) 34.65 .22 33.80 .80 32.96 1.78 
$1.00 Basis 
CT^=62.09 34.20 1.59 33.47 1.45 32.63 3.43 
Uy=35.59 34.48 1.27 34.30 1.46 32.72 3.26 
$1.50 Basis 
ag=62.15 34.32 1.40 33.69 2.15 32.95 3.01 
%y-35.54 35.23 • 33 34.60 1.07 33.87 1.93 
Double 
CTJ_^=59.26 32.97 1.47 31.25 3.21 29.39 5.36 
UFH=34.19 
t to reject Ho is ^nx+n2-2l 1-a ^ here jT^^+n^-al Tggg 
and the value in the table and Cni+n2-2; 1-a ^298.090 ^-285 or 
^298.095 = 1.648. 
to reject Ho is Fni-l,n2-l > ^ni-l, ng-l; 1-a ^ ^^re Fni-l,n2-l 
^149,149 value in the table and 1-a ^149,149.090 
= 1.17 or ^149^149.095 " 
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Options 
"?03 
pb F F 
51.32 1.16 46.92 1.26 42.78 1.39 
61.33 1.04 55.74 1.06 50.53 1.17 
54.63 1,22 54.98 1.21 57.06 1.17 
59.91 1.11 58.24 1.14 58.26 1.14 
54.21 1.01 54.14 1.01 55.72 1.02 
57.33 1.05 55.87 1.02 56.06 1.02 
51.89 1.20 49.99 1.24 49.89 1.24 
52.00 1.19 54.58 1.14 49.70 1.25 
51.48 1.21 49.16 1.26 48.81 1.27 
48.90 1.05 53.65 1.16 50.36 1.23 
44.63 1.33 66.28 1.12 60.87 1.03 
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Figure 13. Gross mean returns and variance for futures 
hedges under five strategies 
135 
2^ 
$40 50 
. II 
.III 
IV 
60 70 
Figure 14. Gross mean returns and variance for option hedges 
under five strategies with a 5 percent premium 
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Figure 15. Gross mean returns and variance for option hedges 
under five strategies with a 10 percent premium 
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Figure 16. Gross mean returns and variance for option hedges 
under five strategies with a 15 percent premium 
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Figure 17. Gross mean returns and variance for futures and 
option hedges with 5, 10, and 15 percent premiums 
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There is no statistical difference between the two variances under 
an option hedge with a 10 percent premium compared to a full futures 
hedge but the option hedge does reduce gross mean returns. If the 
hedger followed the naive sub-strategy (1) then statistically both 
variance and mean gross return are less for the option hedge. The 
option hedge could reduce the variance of gross returns but the gross 
mean return is significantly less — $2.74 per cwt. 
Under the 5 percent option premium a fail to reject Ho results 
for both variance and gross mean returns. There is no statistical 
evidence that a 5 percent option hedge produces a variance or gross 
mean return that is different from a futures hedge. 
For the 15 percent option premium the result is just the opposite. 
Both the naive and rational option hedges show F and t values to 
reject Ho. There is evidence at the 10 percent level that the variance 
and gross mean returns are less for the option hedge than for the 
futures hedge. 
Non-Delivery Month Strategy 
When hedging was done only when the cattle were sold during 
a non-delivery month (January, March, May, July, September, and 
November), the futures hedge yielded a gross mean return of $34.71 
per cwt. with a variance of $66.65 per cwt. The 10 percent rational 
option hedge had a gross mean return of $33.97 and a variance of $58.24. 
A fail to reject Ho for both gross mean return and variance results. 
There is no statistical evidence at the 10 percent significance level 
140 
that the option hedge produces a lower gross mean return or variance 
compared to the futures hedge — although numerically the option 
variance is $8.41 per cwt. less and the gross mean return is $.74 
per cwt. less than the futures hedge. 
The 5 percent rational option hedge leads to a fail to reject Ho 
for both variance and gross mean returns. Statistically, 5 percent 
hedges are not different from futures hedges. The naive option strat­
egy, however, leads to a reject Ho for differences in variance but not 
for gross mean returns providing evidence that the variance is signif­
icantly less under a 5 percent option hedge than a futures hedge. 
The 15 percent rational option shows the variance not to be 
statistically different from the futures hedge, but the gross mean 
return is lower at the 10 percent significance level. The naive 
option hedge leads to a reject Ho for both tests. 
Delivery Months Strategy 
This strategy which hedges cattle on feed only if the feeding per­
iod ends in a delivery month (February, April, June, August, October, 
and December), leads to a fail to reject Ho for all three option hedges 
(for both the native and rational sub-strategies) for tests on equality 
of variance. Thus, there is no evidence at the 10 percent level that 
the variance of the futures hedge is larger than the three option 
hedges. Numerically the differences are small. The futures hedge 
variance is $54.74 while the three rational options variances are 
$54.21, $54.14 and $55.72 respectively. 
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Tests for gross mean return differences leads to a fail to reject 
Ho for both the 5 percent option and the 10 option. For the 15 percent 
option, however. Ho is rejected. The futures hedge has a mean gross 
return of $34.49 while the 5 percent option is $34.65 and the 10 percent 
is $33.80. The 15 percent rational option has a mean gross return of 
$32.96. Evidence suggests that the gross mean return of the 15 percent 
option is less than the futures hedge. For the naive option Ho is 
rejected for both the 10 percent and 15 percent option. 
$1.00 Basis Strategy 
The variance of gross mean return for the futures hedge is $62.09 
per cwt. and for the rational 10 percent option $54.58 per cwt. 
However, the test for significant difference yield a fail to reject — 
no evidence at the 10 percent level of significance that the futures 
variance is greater than the option variance. All other variance tests 
including both naive and rational sub-strategies leads to a rejection 
of Ho. 
The gross mean return for all option strategies and sub-strategies 
are statistically less than the futures hedge. Ho is rejected on all 
tests for equality of gross mean returns. The mean gross return value 
for the futures hedge is $35.59 and for the rational 10 percent option 
$34.30. 
$1.50 Basis Strategy 
Both the 5 percent option and 10 percent option hedge do not 
statistically have lower variances than the futures hedge. The 15 
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percent option does, however, produce a rejection of Ho. There is 
evidence at the 10 percent level that the 15 percent option variance 
is less than the futures variance. The naive sub-strategy rejects Ho 
for all three option strategies. 
Gross mean returns for the 5 percent and 10 percent option are 
not statistically different from the futures hedge. The futures gross 
mean return is significantly larger than the 15 percent option at the 
10 percent level of significance. The naive sub-strategy rejects Ho 
for all three option strategies. 
In regard to Figures 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, only the gross mean 
returns show any discernible pattern. Beginning with Figure 13 with 
the futures hedges and through figures 14, 15, and 16, with the 5 percent 
10 percent and 15 percent options the pattern of gross mean returns is 
down or lower. This is more clearly seen in Figure 17 where all of the 
strategies are displayed together. The futures hedges have the high­
est gross mean returns and the 15 percent option the lowest with the 
5 and 10 percent options in between. The variance pattern is riot as 
obvious. The futures hedges and 5 percent option show higher variances 
than the 10 and 15 percent in Figure 17 but not for all strategies. A 
pattern for 10 and 15 percent option variances does not appear to exist. 
Double Options 
A comparison of a double option with a full futures hedge produces 
a fail to reject Ho for the 10 percent (really 20 percent since it is 
a double) and the 15 percent (30 percent) option hedges for test on 
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equality of variances. There is no statistical evidence at the 10 
percent level of significance that the futures variance is smaller than 
the option variance. There is evidence at the 10 percent level that the 
variance for the 5 percent (10 percent) option is less than the futures 
variance since Ho is rejected. 
All three double option strategies have statistically lower gross 
mean returns than the futures hedge. Numerically the variance for a 
10 percent (20 percent) double option is greater than the futures hedge 
($66.28 verses $59.26) and the gross mean return is significantly 
lower ($31.25 verses $34.19). For a 15 percent option the numeric 
difference in variances is smaller ($60.87 verses $59.26) but the 
gross mean return is much lower ($29.39 verses $34.19). 
Options Comparisons 
Table 19 shows the F and t values for tests of significance in 
comparing the three option premiums and doubles with each other. 
Comparisons are made between the 5 percent and 10 percent, the 5 
percent and 15 percent, and the 10 percent and 15 percent options. 
These tests are used to show if differences exist in variance and 
mean gross returns as the option premium increased and between 
doubles and regular options. With the exception of the double, the 
variance of the 5 percent and 15 percent option hedge was significantly 
different and this was only on the full hedge strategy and the $1.50 
basis strategy. In other words, only the Increase from a 5 percent 
premium to a 15 percent premium caused a significant change in variance 
Table 19. Tests of significance between option strategies for the complete feeding activity 
Hedging 
Stragety 2 2 2 2 2 2 
".05'=-".10 ".05""-".15 ".lo'^-".15 ".05'»-".15 
Full Hedge 
(1) 1.09 
(2) 1.10 
Non-Delivery 
(1) 1.01 
(2) 1.03 
Delivery 
(1) 1.00 
(2) 1.03 
$1.00 Basis 
(1) 1.04 
(2) 1.05 
$1.50 Basis 
(1) 1.05 
(2) 1.10 
1.20* 
1.21* 
1.04 
1.03 
1.03 
1.02 
1.04 
1.05 
1.05 
1.17* 
1.10 
1.10 
1.04 
1.00 
1.03 
1.01 
1.00 
1.10 
1.01 
1.07 
2.31* 
1.95* 
1.03 
1.00 
.99 
.98 
.89 
.21 
.77 
.73 
4.37* 
4.00* 
2.05* 
1.98* 
1.97* 
1.94* 
1.91* 
2.14* 
1.68* 
1.59* 
2.25* 
2.06* 
1.03 
.99 
.99 
.97 
1.03 
1.89* 
.92 
.88 
Double 1.49* 1.36* 1.09 2.00* 4.27* 2.02* 
^Singificance at the 10 percent level or higher is represented by an * and therefore a re­
jection of Ho. 
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and this occurred only on the full hedge strategy and the $1.50 basis 
strategy. The double comparison leads to a reject Ho on both the 5 
percent versus the 10 percent and the 5 percent versus the 15 percent, 
but not on the 10 percent versus the 15 percent option strategies. 
Figure 18 points out the relationship of the numeric variance and 
the three option premiums. No clear relationship exists. Strategies 
I, II, III, and V show a reduction of variance as the option premium 
increases from 5 percent to 10 percent. Strategies I, II, and V show 
that declining relationship continues from the 10 percent to the 15 
percent range. Strategy III, however, exhibits an increase in variance 
in the 10 percent to 15 percent range. Strategy IV and the double 
strategy reveal an increase in variance from the 5 to 10 percent range 
and a decrease from the 10 percent to 15 percent range. 
Gross mean returns exhibit the greatest statistical differences 
between the 5 percent and 15 percent options. In fact, all strategies 
reveal a lower gross mean return for the 15 percent compared to the 
5 percent. Only the double, full hedge and $1.00 basis strategy show 
any significant difference in the 5 percent versus the 10 percent or the 
10 percent versus the 15 percent range. 
Figure 19 indicates the relationship between gross mean returns and 
the various option premiums. All strategies produce a lower gross mean 
return as the option premium is increased. Strategy IV shows a smaller 
change in the gross mean return from the 5 percent to the 10 percent 
ranee than the other strategies. 
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Figure 18. Relationship between option strategies, variance 
of gross mean returns, and various hedging 
strategies 
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Figure 19. Relationship between option strategies, gross 
mean returns, and various hedging strategies 
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The double option and full hedge strategy (I) lie considerably 
below the other strategies implying an overall lower gross mean return. 
The use of some strategy, therefore, can increase the numeric gross mean 
returns over a conventional full hedge or double. 
Naive Versus Rational Option Sub-Strategies 
The two option sub-strategies within each hedging strategy were 
tested to provide a basis for the idea of an option being "insurance"j 
that is, purchasing a put option as insurance against a price decline. 
The naive strategy says that a put is purchased at the beginning of each 
period but never exercised. The cattle are sold on the cash market and 
the option was merely treated as price "insurance" and allowed to expire 
as most insurance policies are used. 
The second sub-strategy, or rational strategy, treats the idea of 
an option as Insurance, but allows for the put to be exercised when the 
transaction costs are less than the exercise profit. A test between the 
rational and naive strategy over the various hedging strategies can show 
whether the need existed to exercise the option when appropriate or to 
always just let it expire. 
Table 20 points out the tests of significance for the two sub-
strategies. Only the full hedge strategy reveals a reject Ho for both 
the variance and gross mean returns. There is evidence at the 10 per­
cent level that the variance and gross mean returns are lower for the 
naive strategy than the rational strategy. The idea of purchasing the 
put option but never exercising it, therefore can be rejected as a 
Table 20. Tests of significance between option strategies (1) and (2)* 
Strategy ^.05 ^ ^.10 ^ ^.15 ^ ^.05 ^ ^.10 ^ ^.15 
Full Hedge 
(1) 51.32 1.20* 46.92 1.19* 42.78 1.19* 33.17 1.51* 31.45 1.58* 29.71 1.67* 
(2) 61.33 55.74 50.53 34.48 32.76 31.03 
Non-Delivery 
(1) 54.63 1.10 54.98 1.06 57.04 1.02 34.09 .86 33.21 .88 32.32 .89 
(2) 59.91 58.24 58.26 34.86 33.47 33.10 
Delivery 
(1) 54.21 1.06 54.14 1.03 55.72 1.01 34.11 .63 33.27 .62 32.42 .65 
(2) 57.33 55.87 56.06 34.65 33.80 32.96 
$1.00 Basis 
(1) 51.89 1.01 49.99 1.09 49.89 1.00 34.20 .12 33.47 1.21 32.63 .11 
(2) 52.00 54.58 49.70 34.30 34.48 32.72 
$1.50 Basis 
(1) 51.48 1.14 49.16 1.09 48.81 1.03 34.32 1.06 33.69 1.10 32.95 1.13 
(2) 58.90 53.65 50.36 35.23 34.60 33.87 
^Significance at the 10 percent level or lower is represented by an * and therefore a 
rejection of Ho. 
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rational strategy. All the other strategies yield a fail to reject Ho 
for both variance and gross mean returns; there is no statistical evi­
dence that the variances or gross mean returns are different under 
either strategy. 
In all cases, however, the numerical variances and gross mean 
returns are lower under the naive strategy. 
Futures Hedges 
Table 21 shows the tests of significance for the cash versus the 
various hedging strategies and some selected hedging strategies com­
pared to others. Surprisingly, the futures hedges do not reveal any 
major differences in variance or gross mean return compared to the 
cash position. 
The cash position gives a higher numeric gross mean return than the 
full hedge strategy, non-delivery month strategy, and the delivery month 
strategy. The $1.00 basis and $1.50 basis strategies have higher nu­
meric values than the cash, but none of the tests yield a reject Ho. 
Only the delivery month strategy has a lower numeric variance than 
the cash position, the rest are higher. The non-delivery month strategy 
is the only strategy that yields a reject Ho for variance. The idea 
that any hedging strategy will reduce variability is disproved by this 
analysis. Only certain strategies will result in lower variances. 
In comparing various hedging strategies with each other, only the 
$1.00 and $1.50 basis strategies compared to the full hedge produces a 
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Table 21. Tests of significance between futures hedges and the 
cash position (complete feeding activity) 
F t 
Hedging Strategy y = u 
Cash versus Full Hedge 1.06 .96 
Cash versus Non-Delivery 1.19 .35 
Cash versus Delivery 1.02 .63 
Cash versus $1.00 Basis 1.11 .63 
Cash versus $1.50 Basis 1.11 .60 
Full Hedge versus Non-Delivery 1.12 .57 
Full Hedge versus Delivery • 1.08 .34 
Full Hedge versus $1.00 Basis 1.05 1.56* 
Full Hedge versus $1.50 Basis 1.05 1.50* 
Non-Delivery versus Delivery 1.22* .24 
$1.00 Basis versus $1.50 Basis 1.01 .05 
^Significance at the 10 percent level or lower is represented 
by an * and therefore a rejection of Ho. 
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reject Ho for equality of gross mean returns. These are also numerically 
higher than the full hedge. The use of these strategies can increase 
mean gross returns over the full hedge. 
Variance differences were not statistically significant at the 10 
percent level except for the non-delivery month strategy versus the 
delivery month strategy. These two variances differed numerically by 
almost $12 per cwt. ($66.65 per cwt. - $54.74 per cwt.). 
Partial Feeding Activity 
Table 22 exhibits the simulation results from using the strategy 
that enables the cattle feeder to decide not to feed cattle using each 
hedging strategy. The full hedge strategy, cash, and double option 
strategy are the same as the Complete Feeding Activity since they are 
used as benchmarks. 
Table 2 3 shows the tests of significance for equality of variances 
and gross mean returns. 
Non-delivery month strategy 
All of the naive option strategies yield a reject Ho but only the 
15 percent rational option rejects Ho for equality of variances ($48.68 
versus $62.65). There is no evidence at the 10 percent level of sig­
nificance that the 5 percent or 10 percent rational option hedges pro­
duces a variance that is smaller than the futures hedge. 
Table 22. Simulation results for the partial feeding activity including futures hedges and 
option hedges with 5, 10, and 15 percent premiums 
n 
Ss ?05 ?15 
150 Full Hedge 34.19 59.26 
150 (1) 33.17 31.45 29.71 51.32 46.92 42.78 
150 (2) 34.48 32.76 31.03 61.33 55.74 50.55 
76 Non-Del. MontJis 34.55 62.65 
76 (1) 33.07 31.33 29.59 47.38 43.03 39.08 
76 (2) 34.59 32.85 31.12 59.96 54.04 48.68 
74 Del. Months 34.13 55.70 
74 (1) 33.28 31.57 29.86 55.35 50.87 46.75 
74 (2) 34.37 32.65 30.92 62.89 57.46 52.40 
61 $1.00 Basis 38.12 76.97 
61 (1) 34.60 32.67 30.74 64.44 58.87 53.75 
61 (2) 37.14 35.15 33.22 77.47 70.42 63.88 
51 $1.50 Basis 38.64 98.26 
51 (1) 35.41 33.41 31.42 62.77 57.48 52.63 
51 (2) 38.09 36.09 34.09 74.03 67.39 61.20 
150 Double 32.97 31.25 29.59 44.63 66.28 60.87 
150 Cash 35.03 55.80 
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The naive option strategies reject Ho for gross mean returns and 
so do the 10 percent and 15 percent rational strategies. The 5 percent 
strategy produces a fail to reject Ho. 
Numerically all but the 5 percent rational option have lower gross 
mean returns than the futures hedge. All of the option strategies have 
lower numeric variances than the futures hedge. The mean gross return 
for the futures hedge is $34.55 compared to $32.85 for the rational 10 
percent option hedge. 
Delivery month strategy 
The numeric values of the variances of all the option strategies 
except the 5 percent rational option are less than the futures hedge. 
Only the 5 percent and 10 percent rational options have higher numeric 
variances than the futures hedges. The numeric variance for the futures 
hedge is $55.70 and the rational 10 percent option has a variance of 
$57.56. However, only the naive 10 percent option hedge has a statisti­
cally different variance from the futures hedge. The 10 percent and 15 
percent option hedges lead to a reject Ho for equality of gross mean 
returns. There is statistical evidence at the 10 percent level of sig­
nificance that the futures hedge has a higher gross mean return ($34.13) 
than the 10 percent option ($32.65). 
$1.00 basis strategy 
All numeric values for gross mean returns and variances for the 
option hedges are less than the futures hedge. The futures hedge has a 
gross mean return of $38.12 and a variance of $76.97 while the rational 
10 percent option has a gross mean return of $35.15 and a variance of 
Table 23. Tests of significance for futures hedges and option hedges for 
the partial feeding activity 
Options 
$1.50 Basis 
Double 
Wg=34.19 
W in t M 
Hedging a 
Strategy ^.05 ^.10 % ^.15 
Full Hedge 
0+1=59.26 (1) 33.17 1.19 31.45 3.26 29.71 5.43 
p =34.19 (2) 34.48 .32 32.76 1.63 31.03 3.69 
n 
Non-Delivery 
0^=62.65 (1) 33.07 1.73 31.33 3.84 29.59 6.02 
p =34.55 (2) 34.59 .04 32.85 1.93 31.12 4.21 
Delivery 
0^=55.70 (1) 33.28 .99 31.57 3.04 29.86 5.17 
y =34.13 (2) 34.37 .27 32.65 1.70 30.92 3.78 
n 
$1.00 Basis 
0^=76.97 (1) 34.60 3.63 32.67 5.73 30.74 7.91 
Wg=38.12 (2) 37.14 .97 35.15 3.00 33.22 5.06 
0^=98.26 (1) 35.41 3.18 33.41 5.13 31.42 7.20 
=38.64 (2) 33.09 .51 36.09 2.43 34.09 4.42 
0^=59.26 32.97 1.47 31.25 3.21 29.39 5.36 
^t to reject Ho is iT^^^+ng-zl - tni+n2-2; 1-ct where | Tnj^+n2-21 ^298 
and the value in the above table and tnj^+n2-2; 1-a *^298*0 90 ^  1*285 
^298;0.95 ^  
to reject Ho is F^^.i ^ £-1, > ^ni-l, ng-l; 1-a where Fni-l,n2-l 
is and the value In the above table and Fni-l,n2-l; 1-a Is 
^149,149;0.90 " ^149,149;0.95 " 
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Options 
<1. F "fis F 
51.32 1.16 46.92 1.26 42.78 1.39 
61.33 1.04 55.74 1.06 50.53 1.17 
47.38 1.32 43.03 1.46 39.08 1.60 
59.96 1.04 54.04 1.16 48.68 1.29 
55.35 1.00 50.87 1.10 46.75 1.19 
62.89 1.13 57.46 1.03 52.40 1.06 
64.44 1.19 58.87 1.31 53.75 1.43 
77.47 1.01 70.42 1.09 63.88 1.21 
62.77 1.57 57.48 1.71 52.63 1.87 
74.03 1.33 67.39 1.46 61.20 1.61 
44.63 1.33 66.28 1.12 60,87 1.03 
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$70.42. Only the gross mean return for the 5 percent rational option, 
however, produces a fail to reject Ho. The other tests all reject Ho 
for both variance and gross mean returns. 
There is statistical evidence at the 10 percent level of signifi­
cance that most of the option hedges have lower variances and gross mean 
returns than the futures hedges. 
$1.50 basis strategy 
This strategy has a very high variance for the futures hedge ($98.26 
per cwt.) and the highest gross mean return ($38.64 per cwt.). Conse­
quently, all of the numeric values for the option hedges are lower. All 
but the rational 5 percent option for gross mean returns leads to a re­
jection of Ho. 
There is considerable evidence at the 10 percent significance level 
that most option hedges produce lower gross mean returns and variances. 
Complete Versus Partial Feeding Activities 
The pattern of change between the numeric differences of the gross 
mean returns and variances of the complete and partial feeding activities 
is shown in Table 24 with the tests of significance shown in Table 25. 
All gross mean return differences increase as the option premium in­
creases. The non-delivery and delivery strategies increase positively 
while the $1.00 basis and $1.50 basis strategy increase from a negative 
value to a positive or less negative value. Since the differences were 
calculated by subtracting the partial feeding activity from the complete 
feeding activity, the Increase in the difference over the option premiums 
implies that the PFA gross mean return diminishes relative to the CFA. 
Table 24. Numeric differences between the complete feeding activity and the partial feeding 
activity for gross mean returns and variances (CFA-PFA) 
Hedging y ^ ^Ll5 ^.05 ^.10 °.15 
Strategy 
Non-Delivery ,16 4.00 
(1) 1.02 1.88 2.73 7.25 11.85 17.98 
(2) .,27 1.12 1.98 .05 4.20 9.58 
Delivery .36 -.96 
(1) .,83 1.70 2.56 -1.14 3.27 8.97 
(2) .28 1.15 2.04 -5.56 1.59 3.66 
$1.00 Basis -2.53 -14.88 
(1) -.,40 .80 1.89 -12.55 -8.88 -3.86 
(2) -2.66 -.85 -.50 -25.47 -15.84 -14.18 
$1.50 Basis -3.10 -36.11 
(1) -1.09 .28 1.53 -11.29 -8.32 -3.82 
(2) -2.86 -1.49 -.22 -15.13 -13.74 -10.84 
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Table 25. Tests of significance between futures hedges for the 
complete feeding activity and the partial feeding 
activity^ 
F t 
2 2 
Hedging Strategy a = o U = P 
Non-Delivery versus non-delivery 1.06 .12 
Delivery versus Delivery 1.02 .29 
$1.00 Basis versus $1.00 Basis 1.24* 1.68* 
$1.50 Basis versus $1.50 Basis 1.58* 1.75* 
^Significance at the 10 percent level or lower is represented 
by an * and therefore a rejection of Ho. 
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The non-delivery and delivery strategies yield a higher mean gross 
return for the complete feeders activity versus the partial feeding 
activity. However, for the $1.00 and $1.50 basis strategies the mean 
gross return was higher for the partial feeding activity. 
Variance difference patterns are similar to the gross mean return 
difference for the four strategies. As the option premium increases, the 
relative position of the partial feeding activity diminishes. The 
numeric variance is higher for the partial feeding activity for all 
strategies except the non-delivery strategy. 
Table 25 shows the tests of significance between the complete and 
partial feeding activities. The test between the non-delivery futures 
strategies and delivery strategies produces a fail to reject Ho. There 
is no evidence that the complete feeding activity has a higher variance 
or gross mean return than the partial feeding activity for the non­
delivery and delivery strategies. The numeric differences are small 
($.16 per cwt. and $.36 per cwt. for gross mean returns and $4.00 per 
cwt. and $.96 per cwt. for the variances) and support this test. The 
$1.00 basis and $1.50 basis strategies, however, lead to a rejection of 
Ho. There is evidence at the 10 percent level of significance that the 
gross mean returns and variances are different for these strategies. 
The gross mean returns are higher for the partial feeding activity 
($2.53 per cwt. and $3.10 per cwt.) but so are the variances ($14.88 per 
cwt. and $36.11). 
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Table 26 exhibits the tests for the various option strategies. 
The option strategy results closely follow the futures results. For the 
non-delivery strategy, only the 15 percent rational option rejects Ho 
for both the gross mean return and variance test. Both the 10 percent 
and 15 percent naive options reject Ho. Tests for the delivery strategy 
indicate no rejection of Ho for equality of variances among the rational 
sub-strategies, and only the 15 percent option rejects Ho for gross mean 
returns. 
The $1.00 basis and $1.50 basis tests reject Ho for variance equality 
over all these options. There is evidence that the partial feeding 
activity produces higher variances than the complete feeding activity. 
For gross mean returns, however, only the 5 percent option test produces 
a reject Ho. There is no statistical evidence that the 10 percent and 
15 percent options are different among the feeding activities. A glance 
at the numeric values in Table 23 lends support to these statistical 
tests. 
The tests for futures hedges and the cash position are shown in 
Table 27. The $1.00 and $1.50 basis strategies reject Ho for tests on 
the equality of both gross mean returns and variances. This was not the 
case on the complete feeding activity. Also, the full hedge versus the 
$1.00 and $1.50 basis strategy test rejects Ho. There is evidence at 
the 10 percent level of significance that the cash and full hedge 
positions have lower gross mean returns and lower variances than the 
Table 26. Tests of significance between option strategies for the complete feeding activity 
and the partial feeding activity^ 
Hedging Strategy a *.io ^.15 ^.05 ^.10 ^.15 
Non-Delivery versus Non-Delivery 
(1) 1.15 1.28* 1.46* .88 1.66* 2.43* 
(2) 1.00 1.08 1.20* .21 .92 1.66* 
Delivery versus Delivery 
(1) 1.02 1.06 1.19* .68 1.43* 2.18* 
(2) 1.10 1.03 1.07 .22 .93 1.69* 
$1.00 versus $1.00 
(1) 1.24* 1.18* 1.08 .29 .60 1.45* 
(2) 1.49* 1.29* 1.29* 1.83* .59 .37 
$1.50 versus $1.50 
(1) 1.22* 1.17* 1.08 .73 .19 1.08 
(2) 1.26* 1.26* 1.22* 1.77* .97 .15 
^Significance at the 10 percent level or lower is represented by an * and therefore a 
rejection of Ho. 
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Table 27. Tests of significance between futures hedges and the 
cash position (partial feeding activity)^ 
F t 
Hedging Strategy y = y 
Cash versus Full Hedge 1.06 .96 
Cash versus Non-Delivery 1.12 .94 
Cash versus Delivery 1.00 .85 
Cash versus $1.00 Basis 1.38* 2.42* 
Cash versus $1.50 Basis 1.76* 2.87* 
Full Hedge versus Non-Delivery 1.06 .33 
Full Hedge versus Delivery 1.06 .06 
Full Hedge versus $1.00 Basis 1.30* 3.05* 
Full Hedge versus $1.50 Basis 1.66* 2.92* 
Non-Delivery versus Delivery 1.12 .33 
$1.00 Basis versus $1.50 Basis 1.28 .29 
^Significance at the 10 percent level or lower is represented 
by an * and therefore a rejection of Ho. 
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$1.00 and $1.50 basis strategies. The complete feeding activity 
(Table 21) rejected Ho for only the gross mean returns but not for the 
test on equality of variances. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although several different variations were tested, the most 
important analysis centers around the futures hedges verses the 
option hedges and how the premium levels affect the option's 
viability. The other analyses concerning option sub-strategies, 
futures versus cash, and the complete feeding activity versus the 
Partial Feeding Activity were presented only for completeness. 
The principal test was simply, as stated in Objective 3, whether 
options can provide an alternative to traditional futures hedging. 
Options as Hedges 
Solid evidence exists both by raw numeric numbers and statistical 
tests at the 10 percent significance level that an option hedge will 
reduce gross mean returns compared to a futures hedge. This is true 
over all strategies and various option premiums. Over 50 percent of 
all the calculated gross mean returns for option hedges are statisti­
cally lower than the full futures hedge and all but three are numerically 
lower. The exceptions are the 5 percent option under a full hedge 
strategy, the non-delivery strategy, and the delivery strategy. The 
5 percent option full hedge strategy yields a gross mean return of 
$34.48 per cwt. while the futures full hedge shows $34.19, or a $.29 
per cwt. difference. This difference was not, however, statistically 
significant — nor was the $.15 per cwt. difference for the non-delivery 
strategy statistically significant. A 5 percent option premium is an 
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unusually low premium and produces a higher gross mean return because 
futures hedging costs (margin costs and brokerage fees) account for 
more than the 5 percent premium. This option advantage quickly 
disappears as the option premium increases over 5 percent. 
As the option premium increases, the gross mean return decreases. 
Certain strategies tend to slow the decrease in gross mean returns — 
but not stop it. Therefore, while the use of options as hedges tends 
to reduce the gross mean returns when compared to futures, an option 
hedging strategy will somewhat offset this loss by slowing the rate of 
decrease. In other words, the use of hedging strategies can partially 
mitigate the lower gross mean returns for options versus futures. 
The variance question is not as easily answered. Each strategy 
other than the full hedge produces conflicting results. Some variances 
increase and others decrease compared to a full futures hedge strategy 
without any apparent or explainable pattern. The full futures hedge 
strategy does, however, give some indication of the variance direction. 
This strategy is perhaps the best strategy to address the variance 
question since it serves as a hedging benchmark. Variance does 
decrease as gross mean returns decrease when the option premium 
increases. This is consistent with the theoretical development 
presented in Chapter 5. The reason the other strategies do not 
completely conform to the theoretical model is that they tend to 
accentuate the position of the cattle cycle. This is not so true for 
the non-delivery and delivery month strategies but it is very true for 
the $1.00 and $1.50 basis strategies. Each of these strategies were 
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activated only during periods of herd buildups and liquidations — when 
price variance was at a maximum. The delivery month strategy picked up 
the delivery month's erratic price behavior typically associated with 
non-storable commodities and the non-delivery month strategy the poor 
price representativeness of non-delivery activity. It is conceivable 
that storable commodities and non-cyclic commodities would more closely 
follow the theoretical aspects of price variance. 
The natural question then becomes: Are option hedges 'superior' 
or 'worse' than futures hedges when both variance and gross mean 
returns are considered? This can partially be answered by Figure 20. 
If the cattle feeder is assumed to be risk averse, then he prefers 
higher returns only when the variance is less than or equal to some 
position. This position is typically the position he is use to; i.e. 
the last pen of cattle he sold. He will not accept lower returns with 
higher variances. Figure 20 divides the preferred and not preferred 
regions over all of the strategies using the full futures hedge as the 
comparison point. The ambiguous regions are points that cannot be 
called preferred or not preferred in the absence of a utility function 
for the feeder. Since no utility function exists these points remain 
ambiguous, nor can an efficiency frontier be generated since alternative 
levels of production were not considered. If the full futures hedge 
is accepted as the dividing plane, then the preferred and not preferred 
points become clear. 
Only the 10 percent (20 percent) and 15 percent (30 percent) double 
options are in the not preferred region. Under no circumstances will 
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the feeder consider these options. They are clearly "worse" than 
any full futures hedge. In the preferred region are six possible 
points - F3, L3, L4, L5, M4 and M5. These are respectfully, delivery 
strategy for futures hedges, delivery strategy of the 5 percent option 
hedge, $1.00 basis strategy of the 5 percent option hedge, $1.50 basis 
strategy of the 5 percent option hedge, $1.00 basis strategy of 
the 10 percent option hedge, and the $1.50 basis strategy of the 10 
percent option hedge. These points can be considered "superior" to the 
full futures hedge. Over eighty percent of the "superior" points are 
options; but sixty percent of these options are 5 percent options which 
are lower than normal premiums. The other two points are 10 percent 
options and therefore represent options that are more likely to occur. 
One of these two points is preferred even to the best futures strategy 
(F3-Delivery month) as illustrated in Figure 21. Using the best 
futures hedge as a comparison point moves the preferred, not preferred, 
and ambiguous regions such that more option hedges fall into the not 
preferred region than with a full hedge comparison point. However, 
the 10 percent $1.50 basis strategy for options remained in the 
preferred region. The answer to the questions of whether option hedges 
are "superior" or "worse" than futures hedges can be partially answered. 
Yes, they are "superior" but only when certain strategies are used. 
Yes, they can be "worse" when premiums for doubles are higher than 10 
percent (20 percent). The remaining points are ambiguous until coupled 
with the feeder's utility function. With a utility function identified 
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the preferred and not preferred areas will change as ..well as what 
constitutes "superior" strategies. 
One observation and conclusion, however, can be clearly stated 
from this analysis: options as hedges for live beef cattle futures are 
not the high return - low risk instrument that much of the popular 
literature says they are. Nor are they, except for doubles, high risk -
low return contracts that many opponents expose as reasons to keep 
options from being traded if they are used as part of a hedging 
program (33, 72, 73, 74, 88, 111). 
Policy Recommendations 
The next logical question is: Given the current ban on options, 
should options be allowed to be traded? This question has more 
ramifications than these analyses can completely address. The analyses 
presented here can, though, provide some realistic guides. Concerning 
options as a hedging mechanism^ from an economic standpoint, given 
the assumptions of the simulation model, options can provide an 
alternative to traditional futures hedging. This argument suggests 
that options should be allowed to be traded — at least on live beef 
cattle futures. The other issues that must be decided to develop an 
option market are those addressed in Chapter 4. These include: 
1) 'strong' versus 'weak' options, 2) fixed versus variable striking 
prices, 3) options on futures versus options qn actuals, and 4) 
exchange traded options versus dealer traded options. 
172 
The analyses of this thesis did not directly address any of these 
issues, but it indirectly addressed all four of them. First, the anal­
ysis shows that for options to be "superior" to full futures hedging 
they must be used in a hedging strategy. 'Weak' or non-retradable 
options severely limit the potential hedging strategies. By having 
'strong' or retradable options (as the securities market does) an al­
most limitless set of hedging strategies can be incorporated. The 
potential for options to serve an even greater economic function can 
be increased by allowing 'strong' options. 
Secondly, the analysis points out the sensitivity of gross mean 
returns and variance differences to the level of the option premiums. 
The level of the premium produces noticeable effects. Having fixed 
striking prices (like the securities market) increases the range of 
available option premiums. Out-of-the-money premiums will be lower 
than at-the-money or in-the-money premiums and could theoretically be 
lower than the 5 percent level. Conversely, in-the-money options' 
premium cost could exceed the 15 percent level. Having fixed Instead of 
variable striking prices increases the economic viability of the options 
market by increasing the flexibility and potential kinds of strategies. 
Points (3) (options on futures) and (4) (exchange trading) do not get 
economic support from the analysis as do (1) and (2), however, they do 
have implications. The simulation model assumed options on futures 
and consequently the results tend to support the viability of these 
options. It does not support, nor refute, options on actuals. The issue 
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of exchange traded options or dealer traded options for this analysis 
was simply the need for uniform price reporting. The simulation model 
could have assumed dealer traded options by assuming that they reported 
uniform prices for the same kind of option. 
This analysis suggests that the option market's economic function 
is not suspect as a hedging mechanism and therefore should be allowed 
to exist for a trial period once the structural problems have been 
adequately answered. Extensions from this analysis suggest the 
structural form should be: 'Strong' options should be used with 
'fixed' striking prices. Options on futures will work as long as 
uniform prices are recorded either by exchanges or dealers. 
Future Research 
Additional option hedging research needs to be performed on stor-
able commodities, fixed striking prices, 'strong' option strategies, 
the effects of option usage on futures market volume, the effects of 
decentralized trading by dealers on price and premium values, options 
on actuals, and the regulatory cost of implementing an options market. 
Proper answers to these questions could provide the CFTC with the 
necessary Information to allow the systematic and orderly development 
of a pilot option market. 
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